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Inter-religion socioeconomic differences are often attributed to religion. Instead, I 
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Egypt’s conversion from Coptic Christianity to Islam. Self-selection was driven by a 
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and lasted until 1856. Using novel data sources, I document that (a) the long-term 
trends of the tax, conversions, and the Coptic-Muslim occupational differences are 
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1. Introduction 
Scribes in the Levant and Egypt are Christians. 
Al-Muqaddasi (1877, p. 183), Muslim historian and geographer, tenth century 
Inter-religion differences in socioeconomic status (henceforth, SES) have been an 
intriguing topic in the social sciences since at least Max Weber’s (1930 [1905]) 
seminal work on Protestantism. Explanations of the phenomenon abound. Weber 
traced the Protestant-Catholic SES gap to a causal impact of religion that operates 
through a Protestant work ethic, and, extending his thesis to Asia, he argued that 
Asiatic religions were less conducive to Capitalism. The recent economics of religion 
literature, while acknowledging the endogeneity of religion, attempts to disentangle 
its causal impact on SES in cross-country studies (Barro and McCleary, 2003; Guiso 
et al., 2006), or in single-country/religion studies that emphasize the impact of 
religion on human capital (Botticini and Eckstein, 2005; Boorooah and Iyer, 2005; 
Becker and Woessmann, 2009; Chaudhary and Rubin, 2011). 
This paper proposes a different answer. Drawing on the inter-religion SES 
differences in Egypt, one of the largest countries in the Middle East, I argue that 
self-selection-on-SES during the process of formation of religious groups is likely an 
important cause of the observed differentials. Newly digitized data from Egypt’s 
population censuses of 1848 and 1868 reveal that among adult active men 33 percent 
of Copts (Egyptian Christians) and only 14 percent of Muslims worked in white-
collar jobs.1 This phenomenon is striking if we take into account that Egypt was 
almost entirely Coptic Christian before the Arab Conquest in 639-641, and, because 
in- and out-migration were relatively small, Egypt’s “Copts” and “Muslims” are 
mostly descendants of the pre-641 population who either chose to remain Coptic or 
to convert to Islam. Bearing this fact in mind, I argue that Copts’ conversion to 
Islam in 641-1868 was characterized by selection-on-SES because of the Islamic tax                                                         
1 I focus on the Coptic-Muslim SES gap because Coptic Christians constituted 94 percent of Egypt’s 
non-Muslims in 1848-1868, besides non-Coptic Christians (4 percent) and Jews (2 percent). For this 
reason, I use the terms “Copts” and “non-Muslims” interchangeably throughout the paper. 
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system. Upon the Conquest, Arabs imposed an annual poll tax (jizya) on every adult 
free Coptic male; a tax that was enforced until 1856. As a regressive tax removed upon 
conversion to Islam, I hypothesize that the poll tax led to the conversion of poorer 
Copts to Islam and to the consequent shrinkage of Copts into a better-off minority. 
The first suggestive evidence on the selection hypothesis is based on documenting 
the national-level long-term trends of the poll tax and of the two outcomes of 
interest, Copts’ population share and the Coptic-Muslim SES gap. This draws on 
novel primary data sources including data on Christian churches and monasteries in 
1200 and 1500 from medieval sources, data on religion and occupations in 641-969 
from papyri documents, and, most importantly, individual-level population census 
samples from 1848 and 1868 that I digitized from the original manuscripts at the 
Egyptian Archives. These censuses are among the earliest pre-Colonial individual-
level population censuses from any non-Western country. 
Three key findings emerge in the long-term trends. (1) The poll tax rate among 
middle- and low-income Copts was, on average, 6-10 percent of the annual wage in 
661-1250 but became negligible in 1250-1517; it was negligible though among high-
income Copts in 661-1517. (2) Copts shrank from almost 100 percent of the 
population in 641 to 16 percent in 1200 and 7 percent in 1848-1868. This was mostly 
due to voluntary conversions to Islam. (3) The Coptic-Muslim SES gap emerged in 
641-969, where Copts were over-represented among white-collar workers 
(specifically, mid-low bureaucrats) and artisans, and the gap persisted in 1848-1868.  
These findings, I argue, are consistent with the selection hypothesis. Whereas the 
higher tax rate in 661-1250 caused a rapid decline in Copts’ population share and the 
emergence of a positive Coptic-Muslim SES gap as farmers and unskilled Copts were 
more likely to convert, conversions subsided after 1200 as the tax rate declined. 
Because the assessment and the collection of the poll tax were decentralized, the 
second evidence is based on exploiting the cross-district variation in the poll tax in 
641-1100, the period where most conversions took place. A simple static framework 
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predicts that, ceteris paribus, districts with a higher poll tax would have a smaller 
Copts’ population share but a larger Coptic-Muslim income gap (the latter result 
holds, for example, if the income distribution is Pareto). The ideal experiment to test 
this prediction would be to randomly assign the poll tax across districts that were 
otherwise identical before 641 and to compare Copts’ population share and the 
Coptic-Muslim SES gap after the imposition of the tax. Unfortunately, this is 
impossible because (a) the tax was not random and (b) the earliest district-level data 
source on religion and SES (occupations) is the 1848-1868 census samples. 
Hence, my empirical strategy compares Copts’ population share and the Coptic-
Muslim occupational differences across districts using a sample of Egyptian free local 
adult active men of a rural origin in 1848-1868. The main regressor is the poll tax in 
641-1100 in an individual’s district of origin, which I measure by two variables. First, 
I use an indicator variable that takes the value of one if the average nominal annual 
poll tax payment in the district in 641-1100 was “high.” I computed this variable 
from papyri poll tax registers and receipts, which survived for only 4 kuras (Egypt’s 
administrative units in 641-1036) that map into 11 out of 76 districts in 1848-1868. 
Second, I use an indicator variable =1 if at least one Arab tribe settled permanently 
in the district in 700-969, which is observed for all 76 districts. This is based on 
historical evidence of the stricter tax enforcement in the districts where Arabs settled 
and replaced the Coptic local elites who were in charge of the tax assessment and 
collection, compared to the districts where the Coptic elites remained intact. 
The findings lend support to the selection hypothesis. I find that Copts whose 
origin is in a “high-tax” or in an “Arab-settlement” district are relatively fewer, but 
differentially more likely to be white-collar workers in 1848-1868. The findings are 
robust to controlling for geographic fixed effects and for proxies of a host of pre-
641 characteristics of districts, including urbanization, the attachment to Coptic 
Christianity, the generosity of the intra-Coptic transfers, the power of the Coptic 
elites, and the resistance to Arabs. Since all districts were (almost) 100 percent Copt, 
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the findings suggest that high-tax districts witnessed relatively more conversions and 
a more extensive selection-on-SES that resulted in a larger Coptic-Muslim SES gap. 
I conducted a number of robustness checks. The findings are robust to alternative 
measures of the poll tax (I also discuss alternative interpretations of the Arab 
settlement indicator). They are robust to using the distance to Arish, the first town 
on Egypt’s North Eastern borders to be captured by Arabs in 639, as an instrumental 
variable for the poll tax (and Arab settlement). In order to address the possibility of 
poll-tax-induced cross-district movement in 641-1868, (a) I document a negative 
impact of the poll tax on the share of villages with at least one Coptic church or 
monastery in the district in 1200 and 1500 as a proxy of medieval Copts’ population 
share in the district, and (b) I provide historical evidence on the state’s restrictions on 
spatial mobility across villages in 641-1868. 
A fundamental limitation of the empirical evidence though is that there are more 
than twelve centuries that elapsed between observing the poll tax and observing the 
outcomes. In the absence of sub-national information on religion and SES before 
1848, it is difficult to rule out this criticism empirically. Furthermore, the long-term 
persistence of the outcomes poses certain theoretical dilemmas. Why did not Copts 
vanish, or, conversely, why did not converts switch back to Coptic Christianity? Why 
did the Coptic-Muslim SES gap persist although Becker and Tomes (1979)’s 
canonical model of intergenerational mobility would predict relatively rapid 
convergence even at very high values of intergenerational correlation of SES? 
I suggest two mechanisms of persistence drawing on both theory and history. The 
first mechanism is that there were likely new conversions in every period because the 
poll tax persisted from 641 until 1856. On the one hand, conversions would cause 
Copts to disappear quite rapidly as Islamic laws, e.g. the death penalty of apostates, 
made conversion an “absorbing state.” But, on the other hand, the Coptic-Muslim 
SES gap may actually increase over time as poorer Copts convert in every period. The 
second mechanism is that each religious group imposed barriers to entry in order to 
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preserve its over-representation in certain skilled jobs after the initial wave of selected 
conversions took place. These “group effects” slowed down the decline in Copts’ 
population share and suppressed any trends in the SES gap. Those mechanisms, I 
argue, fit the historical evidence better than alternative explanations including that (1) 
Copts benefited from modern European influence, (2) Coptic Christianity was more 
conducive to Capitalism and/or to investment in human capital, and (3) Muslim 
rulers favored recruiting Copts, who lacked a local support base, in the bureaucracy. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature. 
Section 3 documents the long-term trends. Section 4 describes the econometric 
evidence. Section 5 discusses the mechanisms of persistence. Section 6 concludes. 
2. Related Literature 
The paper contributes to several literatures. First, it contributes to the economics 
of religion. There are three distinguishing features of the paper. (1) It explains the 
inter-religion SES differences by the self-selection-on-SES of converts. It appears 
that this idea was endorsed by Weber (1996 [1958], p. 6), who noted that conversions 
to Christianity and Islam in India came from the lower Hindu castes. (2) Unlike the 
self-selection mechanism in Botticini and Eckstein (2005) whereby Rabbinic Jews 
with lower taste for education converted out of Judaism because of its emphasis on 
literacy, selection of converts is caused in the Coptic-Muslim case by an economic 
incentive, the tax exemption, and not by a religious incentive, or the desire to read 
the scripts. (3) To the best of my knowledge, the paper provides, despite the data 
limitations, the first econometric evidence on the selection of converts.  
Second, the paper contributes to the empirical literature on institutions 
(Engerman and Sokoloff, 2000; Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, 2001; Nunn, 
2008; Dell, 2010), and particularly, institutions transplanted through military 
conquests (Acemoglu et al., 2011). I document that Islamic taxation that was 
exported to Egypt after a critical juncture, the Arab Conquest, shaped religious 
adherence and inter-group SES inequalities that persisted for over twelve centuries. 
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Third, the paper contributes to the intergenerational mobility literature (Becker 
and Tomes, 1979; Borjas, 1992), where I argue that continuous endogenous group 
formation may increase inter-group SES gaps over time. The persistence of the 
Coptic-Muslim SES gap is consistent with the literature on the persistence of SES 
across multiple generations (Long and Ferrie, 2013; Clark and Cummins, 2015). 
Fourth, the paper contributes to one of the most intriguing topics in Middle 
Eastern economic history, the long-standing economic advantage of the non-Muslim 
minorities in the region. The paper is in line with Courbage and Fargues (1997, pp. 
22-23)’s conjecture that the poll tax might have caused the phenomenon. I discuss 
Issawi’s (1981) and Kuran’s (2004) alternative theories in section 5.2. 
Finally, the paper contributes to Egyptian history. Documenting the trend of 
Copts’ population share using novel data contributes to a long-standing debate on 
the timing of Egypt’s Islamization (section A1.4 in the appendix). Furthermore, the 
paper links two literatures: (a) the effect of the poll tax on conversions [Wellhausen 
(1927 [1902]), but debated by Dennett (1950) and El-Leithy (2005)] and (b) Copts’ 
persistent over-representation in the bureaucracy (Tagher, 1998 [1951]). Strictly 
speaking, I do not claim that the tax was the sole cause of conversions. What I do 
argue though is that the tax was likely a major cause of the Coptic-Muslim SES gap. 
3. Documenting the National-Level Long-Term Trends 
3.1. Egypt’s Taxation in 641-1856 
3.1.1 The Coptic-Muslim Difference in Net Taxes 
Arabs captured Egypt from the Byzantine Empire in 639-641. On the eve of the 
Conquest, Copts constituted the vast majority of the population, whereas non-
Coptic Christians and Jews formed two small minorities (see section A1.4.2). The 
conquering Arabs introduced to Egypt a tax system that provided incentives to 
convert to Islam. Table (I) summarizes the taxes and benefits in 641-1856. Every free 
adult Coptic male had to pay a poll tax (jizya), an annual per head tax paid in coins, 
and Coptic landholders paid an additional land tax (kharaj) assessed on the area and 
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yield of their landholdings and paid in both coins and crops.2 Copts also paid other 
miscellaneous taxes and Coptic churches and monasteries imposed taxes on the rich 
and gave transfers to the poor. By contrast, Muslims were not subject to the poll tax 
and, until around 750, did not pay the miscellaneous taxes. Muslim landholders also 
paid a reduced land tax (tithe, ushur). Yet, the decline in tax revenues, presumably due 
to conversions, led to the imposition of the kharaj and the miscellaneous taxes on 
Muslims since 750. In addition, Muslims were subject to the alms tax (zakat), an 
intra-group transfer, and military conscription in 641-833 and in 1822-1856.3  
I make two approximations in order to compute the Coptic-Muslim difference in 
net taxes: (a) Muslim and Coptic transfers were equally generous, which is plausible 
but is hard to verify because of the difficulty of observing the intra-group transfers in 
641-1856, and (b) conscription was compensated for by state pensions and war 
booty (rizq, ‘ata’) in 641-833 and by wages in 1822-1856, which is supported by 
historical evidence. It follows that converts enjoyed in 641-750 more tax benefits 
than in 750-1856, although these tax exemptions were often violated before 750 (see 
section A1.5 in the online appendix for details). Since 750 though, the net tax 
difference became solely composed of the poll tax until its abolition in 1856. 
3.1.2. The Long-Term Trend of the Poll Tax 
Panel (A) of Figure (I) depicts the long-term trend of the de jure nominal annual 
poll tax among low-, middle-, and high-income brackets. The figure indicates that the 
nominal poll tax remained mostly stable until 1856. Panel (B) translates the nominal 
tax into real values in 701-1500 (data on the price level stop in 1500) showing that 
the real tax decreased among all income brackets. A better measure of the tax burden 
though is the poll tax rate (tax divided by wage), which is plotted in Panel (C). The 
figure indicates that the poll tax in 661-969 was, on average, 8-10 percent of the 
annual wage among low- and middle-income brackets, presumably a significant 
                                                        
2 The Quran (9:29) orders Muslims explicitly to impose the poll tax on Christians and Jews. 
3 Conscription was abolished in 833-1822 with the shift to slave armies (Blaydes and Chaney, 2013). 
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financial burden, and that the tax declined to 6 percent in 969-1250 and 1.4 percent 
in 1250-1517. The tax was negligible though among the high-income bracket. 
But did the actual tax coincide with the de jure values? (1) Papyri poll tax registers 
and receipts in 641-1100 reveal that the actual tax varied much more than the de jure 
amounts. However, the average tax in the papyri is 1.5 dinar (N = 552; SD = 3.7), 
which is close to the average de jure tax assuming that most Copts belonged to the 
low-income bracket. (2) The de jure amounts in 1101-1856 are from officials’ 
handbooks, which, according to Goitein (1963, p. 286), are “basically correct.” 
3.1.3. Was the Poll Tax Regressive? 
Figure (II) reveals that the de jure poll tax rate is decreasing in wages, which 
indicates that the variation in the de jure tax did not offset the wage variation. But 
was the actual tax regressive? A few poll tax registers in 703-733 contain information 
on both the poll tax and the total land tax. Since the total land tax is assessed on the 
total area and yield of landholdings, I use it as a proxy of wealth among landholding 
farmers. I thus regress the poll tax rate (poll tax divided by total land tax) on the total 
land tax. The results in Table (II) indicate that the poll tax rate is decreasing in the 
total land tax; poorer landholders faced, on average, a higher poll tax rate. 
3.2. Copts’ Population Share in 641-1868 
There are no statistics on Egypt’s religious composition before 1848. Yet, using a 
dataset on churches and monasteries that I constructed from medieval sources, I 
estimated non-Muslims’ population share in 1200 and 1500 by the share of Egypt’s 
villages that had at least one Christian church or monastery [Figure (III)]. I find that 
the share was 16 percent in 1200 and decreased to 3 percent in 1500 (7 percent in the 
1848-1868 censuses). My estimates are consistent with those of Courbage and 
Fargues (1997, pp. 27-28), who estimated that non-Muslims shrank to 42 percent in 
680 and 23 percent in 813. Altogether, it appears that non-Muslims shrank into a 
minority by 680 or, at the latest, by 1200 (see section A1.4 in the online appendix for 
details on the churches’ dataset and its contribution to the historical literature). 
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Four demographic processes may account for the decline in Copts’ population 
share in 641-1868 (Fargues, 2001): (1) population replacement via Muslims’ 
immigration or Copts’ emigration, (2) Muslims’ higher birth and/or lower death 
rates, (3) intermarriage between Coptic females and Muslim males (opposite scenario 
is prohibited), which results, by Islamic law, in Muslim children, and (4) conversion 
of Copts to Islam either voluntarily or by coercion. Historical evidence suggests that 
Islamization was driven by conversions (mostly, voluntary) and that the poll tax was 
an important cause of conversions in 641-800. Below, I argue why this is so. 
First, Arab immigration, the largest Muslim immigration to Egypt, was small 
compared to Copts’ population. On the Eve of the Arab Conquest, Egypt’s 
population (2.7 millions) was three times that of the Arab peninsula (1 million) and 
Russell (1966) estimates Arab immigrants in 650 by 100,000. Arab immigration 
subsided after 969 as Arabs lost their elite position to Turks with the shift to slave 
armies. At the same time, Copts rarely emigrated from Egypt, because of their 
unique doctrine that differed from both Catholics and Greek Orthodox Christians. 
Second, as the 1848-1868 censuses predate the demographic transition, they 
provide a glimpse of the demographics of medieval Egypt. The samples suggest that 
(a) within male household heads, Copts had, on average, more children than Muslims 
(1.48 versus 1.35),4 and (b) Muslims had lower mortality at younger ages (10-29 or 
10-39), but higher mortality at older ages (30-79 or 40-79).5 
Third, cross-marriages were rare. This is indicated by the papyri in 641-969 
(Mikhail, 2004, pp. 63-65) and by the 1848-1868 samples that record only two cases. 
This leaves Copts’ conversion as the main cause behind Islamization. Conversion 
was observable by the state; a convert had to endorse Islam in front of the 
authorities, and, in 641-833, had to become a client of an Arab patron and enlist in 
the army. Most conversions were by choice, except for two episodes of persecution                                                         
4 Difference between Copts and Muslims is statistically significant (p-value = 0.003). 
5 See section A1.2 in the online appendix. Mortality differences may stem from age heaping and age 
exaggeration. Since both are negatively correlated with SES, they are less prevalent among Copts. 
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in 847-861 and in 996-1021. In fact, the largest persecution wave was in 1250-1517 
after non-Muslims shrank into a minority. Historical evidence also indicates that the 
poll tax triggered waves of conversions. The Coptic chronicler, John of Nikiu (1916, 
p. 201), described the consequences of increasing the tax in 642-644, “… And now 
many of the Egyptians who had been false Christians denied the holy orthodox faith and lifegiving 
baptism, and embraced the religion of the Moslem.” Other poll-tax-induced conversions in 
701-750 are mentioned by the Coptic chronicler, Sawirus Ibn-Al-Muqaffa’ (1910). 
3.3. The Coptic-Muslim SES Gap in 641-1868 
Documenting the trend of the Coptic-Muslim SES gap is a more challenging task 
because it requires observing religion and occupational outcomes simultaneously. For 
this purpose, I collected all the available individual-level information on occupations 
and religion in 641-969 (N = 402) in the Arabic Papyrology Database (henceforth, 
APD), where I inferred a worker’s religion from his name since converts adopted an 
Arabic name. I describe the dataset in section A1.3 in the online appendix but I note 
here that 72 percent of the sample is from administrative lists and receipts, where, 
arguably, each individual has an equal chance of appearance. I compare the APD 
sample to the 1848-1868 census samples (I describe the censuses in section A1.1). 
In order to measure the SES, I constructed three dummy variables as measures of 
white-collar jobs: (1) White-Collar1 =1 if an individual is a professional, a high-level 
bureaucrat, or a mid-low bureaucrat; these are literate white-collar jobs that are non-
political and non-religious. (2) White-Collar2 =1 if White-Collar1 =1 or if an 
individual belongs to the judiciary, the military/police, or the clergy and the rural 
elites; these additional occupations are literate white-collar jobs that are political or 
religious, and (3) White-Collar3 =1 if White-Collar2 =1 or if an individual is a 
merchant; a white-collar job that is not necessarily literate. I also created indicator 
variables for three other occupations: artisans, farmers, and unskilled (non-farmer) 
workers. By construction, the population shares of White-Collar3, artisans, farmers, 
and unskilled workers must sum up to one, exhausting the occupational distribution. 
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The findings are in Table (III). Copts (56 percent of the APD sample) are over-
represented among white-collar workers in 641-969, which is entirely attributable to 
their over-representation in the mid-low bureaucracy (scribes, land tax collectors, 
accountants). In fact, Muslims are slightly over-represented among the judiciary, the 
military/police, and the merchants, but the differences are not statistically significant 
and the population share of these jobs among Muslims is too small to offset Copts’ 
over-representation in the mid-low bureaucracy. The advantage of Copts is not 
limited to white-collar jobs, however, as they are over-represented among artisans 
(weavers, carpenters, tailors) (p-value = 0.13) and are under-represented among 
farmers. The results in 1848-1868 are strikingly similar. Copts are more likely to be 
white-collar workers (as mid-low bureaucrats) and artisans and are less likely to be 
farmers or unskilled workers. And even though Muslims are over-represented among 
professionals, the high-level bureaucracy, the judiciary, the military/police, the clergy, 
and the rural elites, the population share of these jobs is still too small.  
Comparing the figures in 641-969 and 1848-1868 indicates that the Coptic-
Muslim differences persisted with respect to most jobs, although the gaps with respect 
to mid-low bureaucrats, artisans, and unskilled workers increased significantly. 
A few notes on the findings are in order. (1) The judiciary, the military/police, the 
Muslim clergy, and, perhaps, the high-level bureaucracy were restricted to Muslims 
by law because of their political/religious nature. Nonetheless, Egyptian Muslims 
(converts) were under-represented in these jobs vis-à-vis non-Egyptian Muslim elites 
(Arabs, and later on, Turks) for political reasons.6 (2) Although the evidence above 
relies on occupations, Ashtor (1969) suggests that bureaucrats were better paid than 
artisans and unskilled workers, which indicates that the occupational gaps reflected 
an income difference. (3) The Coptic-Muslim occupational gaps that I described 
above and their long-term persistence are documented in history (see section A1.3.3).                                                         
6 Egyptian Muslims entered the military/police as soldiers, and possibly officers, in 641-833, and they 
later gained access to the judiciary and the Muslim clergy (but less to the high-level bureaucracy). They 
were excluded from the military though from 833 until the reintroduction of conscription in 1822. 
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3.4. Interpretation of the Long-Term Trends 
The key findings in the long-term trends could be summarized as follows. (1) The 
poll tax rate among the low- and middle-income brackets was high in 661-1250 but 
became negligible in 1250-1517; it was negligible though among the high-income 
bracket throughout the whole period. (2) Copts shrank from (almost) 100 percent of 
the population in 641 to 16 percent in 1200 and 7 percent in 1848-1868. (3) Copts 
were better off than Muslims in 641-969 and the gap persisted in 1848-1868.  
Overall, the trends are consistent with the selection hypothesis. The high tax rate 
in 641-1250 caused a rapid decline in Copts’ population share and the emergence of 
a Coptic-Muslim SES gap as farmers and unskilled Copts were more likely to 
convert, leaving behind a Coptic minority that was over-represented among artisans 
and white-collar workers. Then, conversions subsided after 1200 with the decline in 
the tax rate. What I still have to explain though is why the initial SES gap, or the 
initial selection, persisted until 1848-1868. I will come back to this point in section 5. 
4. Empirical Evidence from the 1848-1868 Census Samples 
4.1. Conceptual Framework 
I use a simple static framework to guide the empirical analysis. Each Copt is 
endowed with income 𝑦 ~ 𝑓(𝑦) and religiosity 𝑟 ~ 𝑔(𝑟) where 𝑦 > 0, 𝑟 > 0, and 𝑓 
and 𝑔 are density functions. For the purpose of the model, I assume that income and 
religiosity are independent but I am agnostic about their relationship in the empirics. 
I think of 𝑦 as SES that has multiple dimensions besides income such as education, 
occupation, and wealth, and of 𝑟 as the non-pecuniary cost of conversion which 
includes the psychological attachment to Coptic Christianity and the potentially bad 
treatment of converts as outcasts by Copts or as subordinates by Arabs. Population 
size is of measure one: ∫𝑓(𝑦)𝑑𝑦 = ∫𝑔(𝑟)𝑑𝑟 = 1. Copts pay a lump-sum poll tax 𝜏 
that is removed upon conversion. More broadly, I think of 𝜏 as the Coptic-Muslim 
net tax difference. A Copt chooses consumption (𝑐) and religious affiliation (𝜅 = 1 
if he remains Coptic Christian and 𝜅 = 0 if converts to Islam) in order to maximize: 
  13 
(1) 𝑈 = 𝑢(𝑐) − (1 − 𝜅)𝑟 
Subject to: (2) 𝑐 ≤ 𝑦 − 𝜏𝜅 
where 𝑢′(. ) > 0 and 𝑢′′(. ) < 0. A Copt converts to Islam if:  (3) 𝑢(𝑦) − 𝑢(𝑦 − 𝜏) ≥ 𝑟 
Hence, holding religiosity constant, poorer Copts are more likely to convert, and, 
similarly, holding income constant, less religious Copts are more likely to convert. I 
examine the effects of changing the poll tax on converts’ population share and on 
the difference in average income between those who remain Copts and converts 
(Muslims), which captures the selection-on-income effect of the poll tax. The 
following propositions hold (proofs are in section A3 in the online Appendix). 
Proposition 1: Holding religiosity constant, Copts’ population share is decreasing in the poll tax. 
Proposition 2: Holding religiosity constant, the average (before-tax) income of those who remain 
Copts, 𝐸(𝑦|𝑦 > 𝑦∗), and of those who convert to Islam, 𝐸(𝑦|𝑦 ≤ 𝑦∗), are increasing in the 
poll tax. Thus, the Coptic-Muslim difference in average income could be either increasing or 
decreasing in the poll tax depending on the income distribution. 
Proposition 3 (Jewitt, 2004): Holding religiosity constant, the Coptic-Muslim difference in 
average income is increasing in the poll tax if 𝑓(𝑦) is everywhere decreasing. 
Figure (IV) illustrates the intuition behind these results. Let 𝑦∗(𝜏; 𝑟) denote the 
threshold level of income at which a Copt is indifferent about conversion to Islam at 
a given level of religiosity. The concavity of 𝑢 implies that 𝑦∗ moves rightwards in 
response to an increase in 𝜏, which decreases Copts’ population share (Proposition 
1). As 𝑦∗ increases, the remaining Copts are richer on average as they lost their 
poorest members who were just above 𝑦∗. A less intuitive result is that the same 
effect holds for converts who are richer on average because they gained new 
converts who are richer than any previous convert. Hence, the average incomes for 
Copts and converts increase and the Coptic-Muslim income gap may go up or down 
depending on the income distribution (Proposition 2). For example, it increases if 
the distribution is Pareto, which is commonly used in the literature (Proposition 3). 
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Two notes are in order. (1) I do not endogenize the poll tax as this goes beyond 
the scope of the paper (see conclusion), but I allow for its endogeneity in the 
empirics. (2) I assume that the tax is a lump-sum tax, which implies a greater 
incentive to convert among poor Copts. This is a simplification because there were 
other policies that triggered conversions among rich Copts. For example, rich Copts 
were probably willing to convert in order to access political and religious white-collar 
jobs that were restricted to Muslims. I argue though that the model captures the 
empirical facts because (a) the political and religious jobs were less accessible to 
converts and (b) the population share of these jobs was too small [Table (III)]. 
4.2. Data and Empirical Strategy 
In order to test the conceptual framework, I exploit the cross-district variation in 
the poll tax in 641-1100, the period where most conversions took place. This is 
motivated by the fact that the tax assessment and collection were both decentralized, 
where the local elites in each district played a pivotal role (section 4.3).7 
I observe the two outcomes, religious affiliation and occupational outcomes, in 
the 1848 and 1868 censuses, the earliest data source on religion and occupations with 
information on each individual’s sub-national (district) location.8 I digitized a 
nationally representative sample of each census. I then pooled the two samples and 
restricted the analysis to Egyptian local free Coptic and Muslim active men of a rural 
origin who are at least 15 years of age and with non-missing age, religion, occupation,                                                         
7 In 641-720, Arabs kept the Byzantine tax system intact, whereby village headmen assessed the poll 
and land taxes. Starting from 720, rulers attempted to tighten their control over taxation via 
appointing Arabs as headmen of districts (Morimoto, 1981, pp. 66-91; 175-81). This process 
coincided with Arabs’ settlement in rural Egypt starting from 700. However, in response to a series of 
tax revolts that were ignited by strict tax enforcement, the state resorted to the decentralized tax 
contracting/farming system in the ninth century (Sijpesteijn, 2009), which remained in effect until 
1813 (Cuno, 1992, pp. 17-32). Under that system, the state contracted out through auctions the tax 
collection of each district to individuals (Morimoto, 1981, pp. 231-3). In 1171-1813, tax farming took 
the form of feudalism, whereby high-ranked military officers were granted large landholdings and 
control over the taxation of districts. However, throughout the whole period in 641-1813, villages’ 
elites remained influential in the tax assessment and collection whether they did so directly in 641-720 
or in cooperation with tax collectors who were either appointed by the state in 720-900 or by tax 
contractors/farmers in 900-1856 (Ismail, 1998, pp. 164-7; Mahmoud, 2009, pp. 147-81). 
8 The sub-national location (kura) of 65 percent of the APD sample is unknown (see section 3.3). 
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and district of origin. These restrictions aim at (a) limiting the analysis to the likely 
descendants of the pre-641 population and (b) mitigating the possibility of cross-
district migration of an individual’s ancestors in 641-1868 by excluding those whose 
family origin is in major cities and deserts (see section A1.1 for details). 
Hence, the empirical strategy is based on regressing an individual’s religious 
affiliation and occupational outcome in 1848-1868 on the level of the poll tax in 641-
1100 in his district of origin. Specifically, I estimate the following OLS regressions: (4) 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝑘 + 𝛽11𝜏𝑖 + 𝑋𝑖′𝛽12 + 𝜀1𝑖𝑖  (5) 𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑜 = 𝛽𝑖 + 𝛽21𝑜 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖 + 𝛽22𝑜 �𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖. 𝜏𝑖� + �𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖.𝑋𝑖′�𝛽23𝑜 + 𝜀2𝑖𝑖𝑜 ; 𝑐 = 1, … ,12  
where 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 =1 if an individual i of district of origin j is Coptic Christian and 𝑦𝑜 
=1 if an individual works in occupation 𝑐. I estimate equation 5 for twelve 
occupations separately: (1) the three white-collar indicators, (2) indicators for the six 
sub-outcomes that comprise the white-collar indicators, and (3) indicators for artisan, 
farmer, and unskilled jobs. 𝛽𝑘 and 𝛽𝑖 are full sets of province and district of origin 
fixed effects respectively (11 provinces, 76 districts), 𝜏𝑖 is the poll tax in 641-1100 in 
the district of origin, and 𝑋𝑖 is a vector of pre-641 district-level controls (I describe 
the poll tax measures and the pre-641 controls in the next two sub-sections). 
The conceptual framework makes the following predictions about the coefficients 
of interest. (1) 𝛽11 < 0; districts with a higher tax would have relatively fewer Copts 
in 1848-1868. As all districts were almost 100 percent Copt in 641, Copts’ population 
share in 1848-1868 is approximately equal to one minus the share of converts in 641-
1868. (2) 𝛽21𝑜 > 0 for the white-collar and artisanal indicators and < 0 for the farmer 
and unskilled indicators; Copts are better off than Muslims in “low-tax” districts 
because of the positive selection of Copts in every district. (3) 𝛽22𝑜 > 0 for the white-
collar and artisanal indicators and < 0 for the farmer and unskilled indicators; Copts 
in “high-tax” districts are differentially more likely to be white-collar workers and 
artisans and differentially less likely to be farmers and unskilled workers. 
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4.3. The Cross-District Variation in the Poll Tax in 641-1100 
The empirical strategy relies on observing the cross-district variation in the poll 
tax in 641-1100, a difficult task given the remoteness of the time period. For this 
purpose, I collected all the available individual annual nominal poll tax payments in 
641-1100 from all surviving papyri poll tax registers and receipts with information on 
the sub-national location (N = 408) (see section A1.7). Unfortunately though, poll 
tax papyri survived for only four kuras (Egypt’s administrative units in 641-1036), all 
in the Nile Valley. Panel (A) of Table (IV) shows the summary statistics of the tax 
payments in each kura. The average tax is lower in Qahqawa than in the three other 
kuras by 25 percent, which is due to the high share of Copts who paid zero tax in that 
kura, indicating that there were cross-kura differences in the tax enforcement. I 
mapped the 4 kuras into 11 districts in 1848-1868 and created my first measure of the 
poll tax, an indicator =1 if the average poll tax payment in the district in 641-1100 
was “high,” defined as being greater than 1.3 dinars, the cross-district average. 
As a second measure of the poll tax in the district that is observed for all 76 
districts, I use an indicator =1 if at least one Arab tribe settled permanently in the 
district in 700-969. The usage of Arab settlement as a proxy of the poll tax is 
supported by historical evidence. Panel (B) of Table (IV) reveals that individual poll 
tax payments in 641-1100 are positively correlated, on average, with the incidence of 
Arab settlement in the kura. I argue that this is because Arab settlement altered the 
composition of the local elites who were in charge of the poll tax assessment and 
collection. In kuras where Arab tribes settled permanently by acquiring land in 700-
969, they replaced the indigenous Coptic elites as large landholders and village- and 
kura-headmen (Sijpesteijn, 2009). In those kuras, I argue, Arabs were likely stricter in 
enforcing the poll tax on Copts. By contrast, in kuras where Arabs did not settle, 
Coptic elites remained in power and were likely more lenient in taxation with their 
fellow Copts. That was manifested in their higher tolerance for (a) Copts paying a 
zero or a reduced tax, (b) the piling-up of tax arrears, and (c) fugitives who fled their 
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villages in order to avoid taxation. These three phenomena, but not their variation 
across kuras, are well documented in history (Morimoto, 1981). 
Figure (V) maps the key variables in the analysis. First, within the 11 districts for 
which I have poll tax information, the tax is higher in the north. Second, Arabs 
settled in all regions, but less so in the Nile Valley.9 Third, Copts are a minority in all 
districts in 1848-1868, but are relatively more concentrated in the Nile Valley. Finally, 
Copts are better off than Muslims in 41 out of the 49 districts in which there are any 
Copts, but the gap is larger in districts with a relatively smaller Coptic minority.10 
4.4. Controlling for the Pre-641 Cross-District Differences 
Cross-district differences in the tax enforcement could be driven by a host of pre-
641 district-level characteristics and their omission would bias the OLS estimates. I 
discuss below the controls that I include in the analysis (see section A1.9 for details).  
First, I expect Arabs to enforce a higher tax (or to settle) in richer districts. I thus 
control for a district’s pre-641 average income (or urbanization) by the natural 
logarithm of the district’s urban population size circa 300. Urbanization is commonly 
used in the literature as a measure of economic development. 
Second, I predict that Arabs may enforce a higher tax (or settle) in more religious 
districts as Copts in those districts could afford a higher tax without converting to 
Islam. I thus control for a district’s pre-641 average psychological attachment to 
Coptic Christianity by an indicator that takes the value of one if the district is 
believed, according to pre-641 Coptic traditions, to have been visited by the Holy 
Family during its legendary flight to Egypt.11 The legendary path of the Holy Family 
in Egypt that is officially endorsed by the Coptic Church today is based on a book                                                         
9 The Nile Delta is the northern triangle on the map. The Nile Valley extends from the south of the 
Nile Delta to Egypt’s southern border with Sudan.  
10 The negative correlation between Copts’ population share and the Coptic-Muslim SES gap, which 
follows from propositions 1-3, is confirmed by the regression: 𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑜 = 𝛽𝑖 + 𝛽41𝑜 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖 + 𝛽42𝑜 �𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖 ×
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑖� + 𝜀4𝑖𝑖𝑜 ; 𝑐 = 1, … , 12, where 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎 is Copts’ population share in a district 
in 1848-1868 and the other variables are as in equations 4 and 5. The results are in Table (A.10). 
11 The path may also reflect cross-district variation in income, because it included sites that became 
pilgrimage destinations at some point and a potential source of income for Copts in the district. 
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that was written, according to Coptic traditions, around 400. Nevertheless, because 
the date of the book is not certain, this variable must be interpreted with caution. 
Third, because the pre-641 generosity of the intra-Coptic transfer system in a 
district may affect Arabs’ taxation and settlement policies, I control for this variable 
by the share of villages with at least one Coptic monastery in each district in 1200, 
since monasteries were the main Coptic charity institutions before 641.12 The 
number of Coptic monasteries in a district in 1200 should not differ too much from 
their number before 641 because (a) monasteries likely survived because of their 
large size and wealth, and (b) building new monasteries was prohibited under Islam. 
Fourth, I control for the pre-641 power of the Coptic elites in each district, which 
may have reduced the Arabs’ ability to enforce a higher tax (or to settle). As a proxy 
for this variable, I use an indicator =1 if the district had an autopract agricultural estate 
in 600. The autopragia status was a privilege granted to large landholders in late 
Byzantine Egypt that allowed them to (a) pay taxes directly to the capital rather than 
to local authorities and (b) collect taxes from taxpayers in their constituencies. 
Finally, I control for the resistance to Arabs in each district, which may have also 
mitigated tax enforcement and settlement. As a proxy for military resistance, I use an 
indicator =1 if there was a Byzantine garrison in district in 600; those garrisons 
fought against the Arab army in 639-641. And as a proxy for popular resistance, I 
examined Copts’ tax revolts in 726-768 (this variable is at the region level though and 
so is not included in the regressions). Table (A.9) in the online appendix shows that 4 
out of 5 revolts were in the Delta, indicating that revolts were negligible in the 
Valley. Since districts for which I have tax information are all in the Valley, it seems 
unlikely that the poll tax variation is explained by popular resistance. 
Table (V) shows the summary statistics for all the variables in the analysis 
[statistics on occupational outcomes are in Table (III)]. Muslims are more likely to be 
                                                        
12 Coptic monasteries leased out land to farmers and gave loans and grants to Copts to help pay taxes. 
Copts often took refuge in monasteries in order to avoid paying the poll tax (Morimoto, 1981, p. 118). 
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of an origin in districts with a higher tax in 641-1100 or where Arabs settled in 700-
969. Those districts had a slightly larger urban population in 300, were slightly more 
likely to lie on the Holy Family legendary path, had a slightly smaller share of villages 
with a Coptic monastery in 1200, and were more likely to have a garrison in 600. 
They did not differ though in the incidence of having an autopract estate in 600.  
4.5. Findings 
Table (VI) shows the results on religious affiliation (equation 4). Using the poll 
tax indicator, I find that individuals whose origin is in districts with a higher tax in 
641-1100 are less likely to be Copts in 1848-1868 by about 16 percentage points; a 
large magnitude given that the average Copts’ population share is 6 percent. The 
effect remains negative and statistically significant if I include the pre-641 controls 
and province fixed effects. Using the full sample with the Arab settlement indicator 
generates qualitatively similar results that are smaller in magnitude. Individuals whose 
origin is in districts where Arabs settled in 700-969 (hence, faced a higher tax) are 
less likely to be Copts in 1848-1868 by 6-9 percentage points, and the effect is robust 
to including the pre-641 controls and province fixed effects.13 
Results on occupational outcomes (equation 5) are in Table (VII). Using the poll 
tax indicator in Panel (A), I document that Copts in high-tax districts are differentially 
more likely to be professionals and bureaucrats (White-Collar1=1) than their co-
religionists in low-tax districts. Basically, the Coptic-Muslim gap with respect to 
White-Collar1 is positive in low-tax districts, but is larger in high-tax districts by 85 
percent. The effect stems from Copts’ higher over-representation among mid-low 
bureaucrats in high-tax districts, but the effect holds if I use wider definitions of 
white-collar workers in White-Collar2 and White-Collar3. The results on artisan, 
farmer, and unskilled indicators all have the expected signs but are statistically 
insignificant. Panel (B) controls for the interactions of the pre-641 controls with the 
                                                        
13 I am not able to include both the poll tax and Arab settlement indicator variables in the same 
regression because they are identical in the 11 districts for which I observe the poll tax. 
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Coptic indicator. Although the standard errors are large because of multicollinearity, 
the interaction of the poll tax and the Coptic indicator remains positive and 
statistically significant in the case of the white-collar and artisanal outcomes. 
Results in Panel (C) which uses the Arab settlement indicator are similar but of a 
greater magnitude. Among individuals whose origin is in districts where Arabs did not 
settle (low-tax districts), Copts are more likely than Muslims to be professionals and 
bureaucrats by 10 percentage points, but the Coptic-Muslim difference in “Arab-
settlement” districts is greater by an additional 15 percentage points. I obtain similar 
results if I use White-Collar2 or White-Collar3. The findings with respect to artisanal, 
farmer, and unskilled outcomes are mostly of the expected signs but are not 
statistically significant. Including the interactions of the controls with the Coptic 
indicator in Panel (D) restricts the sample to 35 districts (all in the Nile Valley) where 
I have information on the autopract estates, which reduces the magnitude and the 
statistical significance of the interaction of Arab settlement and the Coptic indicator.  
Overall, the results suggest that Copts whose origin is in districts with a higher tax 
in 641-1100, or where Arabs settled in 700-969, are relatively fewer, but differentially 
better off. They are differentially more likely to be white-collar workers (mid-low 
bureaucrats). They are also differentially more likely to be artisans and differentially 
less likely to be farmers, although the latter results are not always significant. 
4.6. Robustness Checks 
There are at least three concerns about the OLS estimates. First, there may be 
measurement error in the poll tax. Second, the OLS estimates may be biased because 
of unobserved district-level characteristics. Third, there was likely poll-tax-induced 
cross-district movement in 641-1868. I address each of these issues below.  
4.6.1. Measurement Error in the Poll Tax 
I conducted a number of robustness checks in order to address the measurement 
error in observing the poll tax in the papyri poll tax documents in 641-1100 (see 
Tables (A.2) and (A.3) in the online appendix). (1) Instead of using the “average” 
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poll tax, I re-estimated the regressions using an indicator =1 if the median poll tax was 
“high.” (2) I dropped two kuras where the number of observations in the papyri is 
less than ten. (3) Instead of using an indicator, I used the actual average and median 
poll taxes in dinars. (4) I dropped the kura of Qahqawa, where the papyri are from an 
earlier date, using the median tax indicator. (5) I clustered the standard errors at the 
kura level (the downside is that there are only 4 kuras). (6) I argue that controlling for 
urbanization in 300 and for geographic fixed effects mitigates the concern that I only 
observe the nominal poll tax and not the real tax or the poll tax rate. 
As a proxy variable, the Arab settlement indicator admits of alternative 
interpretations, but a valid interpretation must predict that Copts in Arab-settlement 
districts are relatively fewer and differentially better off. This seems unlikely. (1) 
Settlement captures a mechanical negative effect on Copts’ population share, because 
Arabs were Muslims. This effect is negligible though because settlement was small 
(section 3.2.2) and it does not explain why Copts of those districts are differentially 
better off. (2) Arabs may have forced poorer Copts to convert in the districts they 
settled in. Coerced conversions were rare though in 700-969. (3) Arabs may have 
promised poorer Copts with non-pecuniary benefits of conversion (e.g. salvation). 
However, settlement is positively correlated with the Holy Family path indicator, 
suggesting that Arabs settled in more religious districts. (4) As Arab settlers replaced 
Coptic elites, it would mechanically reduce Copts’ average SES. But this would 
predict that Copts of those districts are differentially worse off. (5) Settlement may 
reflect a district’s income only, as Arabs chose richer districts. But there is no reason 
in this case to observe a correlation between settlement and conversions or SES. 
4.6.2. Instrumental Variable (IV) Strategy 
I employ an instrumental variable (IV) strategy in order to address the potential 
endogeneity of the tax that stems from omitted unobserved characteristics of districts. 
As an IV for the poll tax (and Arab settlement) in equation 4, I use a district’s 
distance to Arish, a town close to Egypt’s North Eastern borders that was the first to 
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be captured by Arabs in 639 because of its proximity to the Arab peninsula. Also, I 
use “Copt * Distance to Arish” as an IV for the interaction term in equation 5. 
Is the distance to Arish a relevant and exogenous IV? First, Table (A.4) in the 
appendix suggests that the poll tax was higher and Arabs were more likely to settle in 
the districts that are closer to Arish (that were conquered first). Second, the distance 
to Arish arguably satisfies the exclusion restriction, because the proximity to Arish, a 
small border town, was likely uncorrelated with the pre-641 characteristics of 
districts. Indeed, Table (A.4) indicates that pre-641 urbanization, religiosity, power of 
Coptic elites, and military resistance in a district are all uncorrelated with the district’s 
distance to Arish. The only exception is that a district’s share of villages with a 
Coptic monastery in 1200 is positively correlated with the distance to Arish. 
The IV estimation results on religious affiliation are shown in Table (A.5). First-
stage regressions indicate that the distance to Arish is a strong IV, except in column 
6, where I use a smaller sample. Second-stage estimates of the effects of the poll tax 
(Arab settlement) on the Coptic indicator are negative, statistically significant, and 
larger in absolute value than the OLS estimates, except in column 6. 
The results on occupational outcomes are in Table (A.6). The first-stage 
regression in Panel (A), which uses the poll tax variable, shows that “Copt * Distance 
to Arish” is a strong IV. The second-stage regression indicates that Copts in high-tax 
districts are differentially more likely to be white-collar workers and artisans and 
differentially less likely to be farmers than Copts in low-tax districts. Panel (B), which 
uses the Arab settlement indicator, produces stronger results than the OLS. 
4.6.3. The Poll-Tax-Induced Movement across Districts in 641-1868 
Another source of endogeneity is the possibility of cross-district movement in 
641-1868 (via migration or Coptic-Muslim differences in birth and death rates) that 
was induced by differences in the poll tax. There are two counter-arguments here. 
First, using the share of villages with at least one Coptic church or monastery in 1200 
and 1500 in each district as a proxy of the district’s medieval Copts’ population share 
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in equation 4, yields qualitatively similar results to Table (VII) [see Table (A.7)]. This 
indicates that the impact of the tax on Copts’ population share held in 1200 and 
1500. Second, historical evidence suggests that the state controlled spatial mobility in 
rural Egypt in 641-1868, because the assignment of land, taxes, conscription, and 
corvée in public works were all based on an individual’s village of residence. 
Morimoto (1981, pp. 113-24) describes the problem of fugitives in 641-969, those 
who fled their villages in order to escape taxation, and the state’s measures to identify 
and send fugitives back to their villages. This problem persisted in 1517-1868 
(Mahmoud, 2009, pp. 159-60; Cuno, 1992, pp. 121-124). In the nineteenth century, 
the state issued travel permits in order to control migration across villages. 
5. Explaining the Persistence of the Poll Tax Effects 
5.1. Mechanisms of Persistence 
The econometric evidence in section 4 suggests that the initial selection-on-SES 
of converts that was triggered by the poll tax in 641-1100 persisted at the district 
level for over twelve centuries until 1848-1868. There are, I argue, two mechanisms 
that may account for this somehow puzzling long-term persistence. But, in the 
absence of district-level data on religion and occupational outcomes before 1848, the 
evidence is only at the national level and essentially rests on theory and history. 
The first mechanism is based on two historical facts: (1) the poll tax was not a 
one-time policy but rather a long-standing institution that persisted from 641 to 
1856, and (2) three Islamic laws made conversion an “absorbing state,” (a) the death 
penalty of apostates, (b) the offspring of a Muslim father is automatically Muslim, 
and (c) Muslim females may only marry Muslim males. Adding to these facts the 
observation that in every period some Copts may experience downward mobility due 
to a negative income shock, Copts’ population share would likely decrease to zero 
quite rapidly, because in every period some poor Copts may convert to Islam (the fall 
in the tax rate in 1250-1517 may explain the slowdown in conversions after 1200). 
More important though, once I allow for a continuous process of endogenous group 
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formation via new conversions to Islam among Copts, there is no reason to expect that 
the Coptic-Muslim SES gap would disappear over time. In fact, the gap may even 
increase as poorer Copts convert in every period, leaving behind a rapidly shrinking 
Coptic minority that is growing differentially richer over time. 
The second mechanism of persistence is that there were “group effects” on 
occupational status, because each religious group imposed barriers to entry into the 
skilled occupations in which it was over-represented after the initial wave of selected 
conversions took place. Conceptually, adding a group effect is similar to Borjas’ 
(1992) concept of “ethnic capital,” in which child’s human capital depends on both 
parental human capital and the average human capital of the group. But unlike 
Borjas’ model that treats the inter-group human capital differences as exogenous, the 
Coptic-Muslim SES gap is endogenously altered via new conversions in every period. 
Because the group effect partially offsets the tax incentive to convert, it slows down 
the decline in Copts’ population share, hence protecting Copts from “extinction.” It 
also slows down any trends in the SES gap making it more likely to persist over time.  
There are two pieces of evidence on the existence of religious group effects. First, 
the guild system restricted access to apprenticeship that was required in most 
artisanal and white-collar occupations (Raymond, 1973, pp. 544-51). Copts restricted 
access to the guilds of mid-low bureaucrats, carpenters, jewelers, and tailors. In the 
words of Lord Cromer, the British consul of Egypt in 1883-1908, the Coptic 
accounting system was “archaic” and “incomprehensible to anyone but themselves” (Tagher, 
1998 [1951], p. 213). This was not a nineteenth-century phenomenon, because in 
969-1171, “the persistence of Coptic administrative personnel [was because] the agrarian 
administration was very complex and not easily mastered. In it the Copts played an important role 
at the local level as well as at the central offices in the capital… The administrative knowledge was 
passed on by the officials in their families when fathers employed their sons, thus maintaining the 
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hold of the family over posts,” (Samir, 1996, p. 190).14 In addition, Coptic schools that, 
unlike Muslim schools, taught arithmetic and geometry in order to train Coptic 
children for jobs in the mid-low bureaucracy were not open to Muslims, because 
schools were religiously segregated (Heyworth-Dunne, 1938, pp. 2-7, 84-92). 
Second, I used the 1848-1868 census samples to estimate the impact of religious 
affiliation on son’s occupational outcome, controlling for father’s occupation. One 
caveat though is that I only observe son’s and father’s occupations if the son resided 
with his father. Specifically, I estimate the following OLS regressions: (6) 𝑦𝑖ℎ𝑜 = 𝛽3𝑜 + 𝛽31𝑜 𝑓𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖ℎ + 𝛽32𝑜 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑟𝑐𝑢𝑐𝑖ℎ + 𝜀3𝑖ℎ𝑜 ;𝑐 = 1, … ,12 
where 𝑦𝑖ℎ
𝑜  =1 if a son 𝑖 in household ℎ has occupation 𝑐; 𝑓𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑐 =1 if the 
father has the same occupation as his son; 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑟𝑐𝑢𝑐 is the population share 
of occupation 𝑐 in the son’s religious group computed within the father’s generation.  
The results are in Table (A.8) in the appendix. (1) Intergenerational correlations 
of occupational outcomes (𝛽31𝑜 ) are positive for the white-collar, artisan, farmer, and 
unskilled indicators. (2) Group effects (𝛽32𝑜 ) are positive for the white-collar, artisan, 
and farmer indicators, but are not statistically significant for the unskilled indicator, 
where imposing entry barriers is likely difficult due to the low skill level of the job.  
A final remark on the group effects is important here. One may interpret the 
group effect, and, in particular, teaching secular subjects in Coptic schools, as 
evidence on Copts’ higher taste for education that induced Copts with lower 
educational taste to convert out of Christianity. I argue that this interpretation, which 
is inspired by Botticini and Eckstein (2005), is not consistent with the historical 
evidence because (a) there is no literacy requirement under Coptic Christianity 
(illiteracy among adult male Copts was 34 percent in 1986) and (b) Coptic schools 
were purely religious before 641 (Nasim, 1991) and, in fact, the earliest evidence on 
                                                        
14 One may wonder how Copts succeeded in hiding their wealth from Muslim rulers who often taxed 
wealth opportunistically. A possible reason is that Copts’ economic advantage did not stem from 
wealth but from wages, which were less taxed by Muslim rulers. 
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teaching secular subjects is from 1693, long after Copts shrank into a minority.15 
Hence, I interpret Copts’ higher investment in secular education in 1693-1868 as an 
example of the barriers to entry into skilled jobs; specifically, a mechanism to 
preserve Copts’ advantage in the mid-low bureaucracy in which they were over-
represented, but it did not itself serve as a selection mechanism. Moreover, this 
mechanism does not account by itself for Copts’ persistent over-representation in 
artisanal jobs, which is perhaps explained by other barriers to entry (apprenticeship). 
5.2. Alternative Explanations 
I argue that the alternative explanations of the Coptic-Muslim SES gap are not 
consistent with the historical evidence. Weber explained Protestants’ economic 
advantage by their work ethic. Yet, both the Coptic and Egyptian Muslim cultures 
were mystical, and, moreover, Copts’ advantage stemmed from bureaucracy and not 
from commerce, indicating that Coptic Christianity was not more conducive to 
Capitalism than Islam.16 Using a different rationale, Kuznets (1960) explained Jews’ 
advantage by a minority’s attempt to preserve its identity via specializing in 
occupations in which it built a tradition. But this does not explain why Copts, who 
were initially the majority, shrank into a minority. Jews’ economic advantage is also 
explained by the ban on Jews from practicing certain occupations such as farming. 
Yet, Copts were not banned from farming (one third of adult active male Copts in 
1848-1868 were farmers). If anything, Copts were mostly banned from political and 
religious white-collar jobs, which may have mitigated the gap. 
Within the Middle East, Issawi (1981) and Kuran (2004) argued that the privilege 
of non-Muslim minorities emerged in the nineteenth century because Europeans 
favored non-Muslims or because non-Muslims adopted European legal structures.                                                         
15 The earliest account is by Sadlier (1693): “... the children were taught religion, good manners, to 
read and write Arabic and Coptic... and were taught geometry and arithmetic because these two sciences are 
very useful and necessary on account of the overflowing of the Nile, whereby the limits are lost; so that it becomes 
necessary for them to measure out their land, and by the benefit of the first of these sciences they compute the yearly 
increase,” Heyworth-Dunne (1938, p. 85). 
16 Copts and Egyptian Muslims (traditionally, Sufis) shared beliefs in saints, martyrs, miracles, and 
apparitions that often attributed materialistic success to metaphysical factors rather than to hard work. 
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However, this theory does not explain why the Coptic-Muslim SES gap emerged in 
641-969, long before the rise of Europe. Moreover, Copts’ privilege did not originate 
from commerce where European influence was important but from bureaucracy and 
artisanship, where Europeans had less of an influence. For those reasons, Issawi’s 
and Kuran’s theories do not seem applicable to Copts, although they may still 
explain the privilege of the other non-Muslim minorities who excelled in commerce.  
Finally, one may argue that rulers favored Copts in the bureaucracy for political 
reasons, because as a minority, Copts lacked a support base. This theory is not 
complete though because it does not explain (a) why Copts are over-represented 
among artisans, (b) why Copts shrank into a minority, and, (c) why Copts are over-
represented in the bureaucracy in 641-969 although they are in the majority (56 
percent).17 Hence, I argue that the persistence of Copts in the bureaucracy was not 
only for political reasons, but also because (a) the population share of skilled 
converts was small, and (b) human capital was occupation-specific, and so, for 
example, a literate convert could not work as a scribe without apprenticeship. 
6. Conclusion 
Drawing on novel primary data sources, I traced the origins of the superior SES 
of the Coptic Christian minority in Egypt to the Islamic tax system that was imposed 
upon the Arab Conquest of the then-Coptic Christian Egypt in 639-641. In 
particular, I hypothesized that the poll tax, a regressive tax removed upon conversion 
to Islam, led to the shrinkage of Copts into a better-off minority. I first drew 
suggestive evidence on the hypothesis from the long-term trends of the poll tax, 
Copts’ population share, and the Coptic-Muslim SES gap. Then, using the 1848-1868 
population censuses, I documented that districts with a higher tax in 641-1100 had 
relatively fewer, but differentially richer, Copts in 1848-1868. Finally, I argued that 
the persistence of the initial selection is explained by Copts’ continuous conversions, 
as the tax persisted until 1856, and by group effects in access to skilled jobs.                                                         
17 Most of the APD sample is from the Nile Valley where there were relatively more Copts. 
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The findings raise intriguing questions that open two future areas of research. 
First, and foremost, there is the issue of the political economy of Islamic taxation. 
Why did Arabs choose a “soft” policy, taxation, instead of coercing Copts into 
conversion? Why did they choose a regressive tax that triggered the masses, but not the 
elites, to convert? In doing so, why did they risk creating hostile elites? Why did not 
they raise the poll tax over time in order to induce the remaining Copts to convert as 
they were likely shrinking into an increasingly richer minority? Historical evidence 
offers some clues to these questions. (1) Taxation was preferable to coerced 
conversions, because it created a (potential) support base without running into the 
risk of rebellions. Interestingly, Romans followed an earlier similar policy of 
exempting Roman citizens from the poll tax. (2) Arabs wanted, besides winning 
converts, a stable stream of poll tax revenues, and imposing a regressive tax likely 
allowed them to achieve the two contradicting objectives. (3) Islamic law ensured in 
fact that the political elite was Muslim (not necessarily, Egyptian), while leaving the 
politically powerless mid-low bureaucracy and artisanship in Copts’ hands. (4) Poll 
tax revenues became negligible as Copts shrank into a minority, and given the cost of 
tax collection, rulers shifted their efforts since 750 from the poll tax to the land tax 
(kharaj), which became a universal tax on both Copts and Muslims.18 
The second area of research relates to the external validity of the selection 
hypothesis to other parts of the Middle East and beyond. At this stage, we know 
little about the formation processes of non-Muslim minorities in the region and so I 
could only speculate on the answer. (1) Selection-on-SES of converts (not necessarily 
caused by taxation) is perhaps generalizable to other contexts. (2) There were cross-
country differences in Arab settlement in the post-Conquest period due to 
differences in land confiscation policies. (3) Copts restricted entry to the bureaucracy 
partially because of Egypt’s complex agricultural system, but group effects were                                                         
18 Even on pure theoretical grounds, it may not be optimal to increase the poll tax over time because 
the elasticity of demand for Coptic Christianity is in fact unchanged in the case of the positive selection 
of Copts (Tirole, forthcoming). 
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perhaps less important in other countries. (4) Egypt’s non-Coptic Christians and 
Jews, who excelled in commerce, may be more comparable than Copts to other non-
Muslims in the region. Fortunately, there are unexplored data sources that could be 
used to extend this research including papyri documents (98 percent of which are 
unpublished), sixteenth-century Ottoman tax registers, and Ottoman population 
censuses in 1891-1914. These sources may reshape our understanding, not only of 
the non-Muslim minorities, but also of the history of the region more generally. 
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TABLE I  
The Coptic-Muslim Differences in Net Taxes in 641-1856 
 
Tax/Benefit Copts Converts (Muslims) Coptic-Muslim Difference 
in Net Taxes 
  641-750 750-1856 641-750 750-1856 
1. Poll tax? Yes No (?) No Yes (?) Yes 
2. Land tax (kharaj)? Yes Reduced land tax (ushur) (?) Yes Kharaj - ushur (?) No 
3. Miscellaneous taxes? Yes No (?) Yes Yes (?) No 
4. Intra-group transfers?  Yes Yes (?) Yes No (?) No (?) 
5. Military conscription? No Yes (compensated for by state pensions 
and war booty (‘ata’) in 641-833 and by 
wages in 1822-1856); No in 833-1822 
No (?) No (?) 
 
Sources: See section A1.5 in the online appendix. Also, see the discussion in section A1.5 on how the 
actual taxation in 641-750 may have differed from that in the table. A question mark in parentheses in 
the third column indicates that there is uncertainty regarding the actual enforcement on converts of 
the tax/benefit under consideration. A question mark in the last two columns indicates that there is 
uncertainty if the tax/benefit differed or not in practice across Copts and converts. The specific 
components of the miscellaneous taxes changed over time. In 641-661, they provided funds for the 
“entertainment” of Muslims (military expenses and lodging for officials) and for the village overhead 
expenses. In 661-750, they supplied maintenance for the governor and officials and funds for public 
projects. In 750-1171, they expanded to include pasture tax, weir tax, and taxes on various crops and 
products. In 1171-1856, they included taxes on pasturage, industry, mines, fisheries, trade and 
transactions, property, maintenance of public services, war taxes, and taxes on vice.  
 
TABLE II 
Landholding Farmers’ Poll Tax Rate and Total Land Tax in 700 
 
Dependent Variable: Poll Tax Rate = Annual Poll Tax (Dinars)/Annual Total Land Tax (Dinars) 
 (1) (2) 
Annual total land tax (dinars) -0.041*** -0.036*** 
 (0.015) (0.013) 
Sub-district FE?  No Yes 
Observations 230 230 
Adjusted R2 0.014 0.112 
 
Source: The Greek papyri poll tax registers of three sub-districts in the kura of Qahqawa (pre-641, 
Aphrodito) in 703-733 (Morimoto 1981, pp. 67-79, 85-87). The sample is restricted to landholding 
farmers, i.e. individuals who paid a positive land tax. See section A1.7 in the online appendix for more 
details on the data source. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * p-value < 0.1, ** p-value < 
0.05, *** p-value < 0.01. A constant term is included in the first regression.  
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TABLE III 
 The Coptic-Muslim Occupational Differences in 641-1868 
  
 641-969 1848-1868 Change between 641-969 and 
1848-1868 
 (1) 
Copts 
(2) 
Muslims 
(3) 
Diff 
(4) 
Copts 
(5) 
Muslims 
(6) 
Diff 
(7) = (4) 
- (1) 
Copts 
(8) = (5) 
- (2) 
Muslims 
(9) = (6) 
- (3) 
Diff 
White-Collar1 
= 1 if: 
0.18 
(0.39) 
0.09 
(0.28) 
0.09*** 
[0.03] 
0.18 
(0.39) 
0.02 
(0.13) 
0.16*** 
[0.01] 
0.00 
[0.03] 
-0.07*** 
[0.02] 
0.07** 
[0.04] 
= 1 if Professional 0.03 
(0.16) 
0.01 
(0.11) 
0.02 
[0.01] 
0.00 
(0.03) 
0.00 
(0.06) 
-0.00*** 
[0.00] 
-0.03** 
[0.01] 
-0.01 
[0.01] 
-0.02 
[0.01] 
= 1 if High 
Bureaucracy 
0.02 
(0.15) 
0.01 
(0.08) 
0.02 
[0.01] 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.06) 
-0.00*** 
[0.00] 
-0.02** 
[0.01] 
-0.00 
[0.01] 
-0.02* 
[0.01] 
= 1 if Mid-Low 
Bureaucracy 
0.13 
(0.34) 
0.07 
(0.25) 
0.06** 
[0.03] 
0.18 
(0.38) 
0.01 
(0.10) 
0.17*** 
[0.01] 
0.05* 
[0.03] 
-0.06*** 
[0.02] 
0.11*** 
[0.03] 
          
White-Collar2 
= 1 if White-
Collar1 = 1 or: 
0.22 
(0.41) 
0.13 
(0.33) 
0.09** 
[0.04] 
0.20 
(0.40) 
0.07 
(0.26) 
0.13*** 
[0.01] 
-0.01 
[0.03] 
-0.05** 
[0.03] 
0.04 
[0.04] 
=1 if Judiciary, 
Military, Police 
0.01 
(0.09) 
0.02 
(0.15) 
-0.01 
[0.01] 
0.01 
(0.08) 
0.03 
(0.17) 
-0.02*** 
[0.00] 
-0.00 
[0.01] 
0.01 
[0.01] 
-0.01 
[0.01] 
= 1 if Clergy, 
Rural Elite 
0.03 
(0.16) 
0.02 
(0.13) 
0.01 
[0.01] 
0.02 
(0.12) 
0.03 
(0.16) 
-0.01*** 
[0.00] 
-0.01 
[0.01] 
0.01 
[0.01] 
-0.02 
[0.01] 
          
White-Collar3 
= 1 if White-
Collar2 = 1 or: 
0.22 
(0.42) 
0.15 
(0.36) 
0.07* 
[0.04] 
0.22 
(0.42) 
0.10 
(0.30) 
0.13*** 
[0.01] 
0.00 
[0.03] 
-0.06** 
[0.03] 
0.06 
[0.04] 
 = 1 if Merchant 0.01 
(0.09) 
0.03 
(0.17) 
-0.02 
[0.01] 
0.02 
(0.14) 
0.02 
(0.15) 
-0.00 
[0.00] 
0.01* 
[0.01] 
-0.00 
[0.01] 
0.02 
[0.01] 
          
 =1 if Artisan 0.19 
(0.40) 
0.14 
(0.34) 
0.06 
[0.04] 
0.27 
(0.44) 
0.11 
(0.31) 
0.16*** 
[0.01] 
0.08*** 
[0.03] 
-0.03 
[0.03] 
0.11*** 
[0.04] 
          
= 1 if Farmer 0.34 
(0.47) 
0.44 
(0.50) 
-0.10** 
[0.05] 
0.34 
(0.47) 
0.50 
(0.50) 
-0.15*** 
[0.01] 
0.00 
[0.03] 
0.06 
[0.04] 
-0.05 
[0.05] 
          
= 1 if Unskilled 0.24 
(0.43) 
0.27 
(0.44) 
-0.03 
[0.04] 
0.16 
(0.37) 
0.30 
(0.46) 
-0.14*** 
[0.01] 
-0.08*** 
[0.03] 
0.03 
[0.03] 
-0.11** 
[0.05] 
% Copts 56.47% 6.7%    
Observations 227 175  1121 15520     
 
Source: The APD sample on occupations and religion in 641-969 and the 1848-1868 census samples 
(see text and sections A1.1 and A1.3 in the online appendix for details). Standard deviations are in 
parentheses. Robust standard errors are in brackets. * P-value < 0.10, ** P-value < 0.05, and *** P-
value < 0.01. Differences in columns (3), (6), (7), (8), and (9) are estimated from the regressions: 
𝑦𝑖𝑖 = ∑ 𝛽1𝑙𝑑𝑙2𝑙=1 + ∑ 𝛽2𝑙(𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 × 𝑑𝑙)2𝑙=1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑖 , where 𝑦𝑖𝑖  is a dummy variable indicating the 
occupational outcome of individual 𝑖  in period 𝑐  (= 641-969 or 1848-1868); 𝑑𝑙  are period fixed 
effects; 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 is an indicator for being Coptic Christian; 𝜀𝑖𝑖 is an error term. 
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TABLE IV 
 Individual-Level Annual Poll Tax Payments (Dinars) in 641-1100 
Panel (A): Descriptive Statistics by Kura  
Name Period N % No Tax Median Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Ihnas 701-900 10 0 1.38 1.35 0.50 0.88 2.25 
Ashmunayn 731-1100 77 0 0.96 1.36 1.18 0.17 6.71 
Fayum 641-1005 7 0 0.99 1.34 0.81 0.25 2.67 
Qahqawa 703-733 314 46.5 1 1.07 1.27 0.00 5.00  
Panel (B): Determinants of Individual-Level Poll Tax Payments in 641-1100 
Dependent Variable: Individual-Level Annual Nominal Poll Tax Payment in Dinars 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
=1 if Arab settlement in kura in 700-969 0.290** 
(0.133) 
 
 
 
 
0.203 
(0.985) 
0.214 
(0.960) 
Log (urban population) in 300  
 
0.131** 
(0.062) 
 
 
0.040 
(0.468) 
0.032 
(0.515) 
=1 if kura on Holy Family route in 400  
 
 
 
0.285** 
(0.139) 
 
 
0.007 
(0.346) 
Observations 408 408 408 408 408 
Adjusted R2 0.007 0.005 0.007 0.007 0.002 
Source: Papyri poll tax registers and receipts in 641-1100 combined with multiple data sources. See 
sections A1.7, A1.8, and A1.9 in the online appendix for details. Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. A constant term is included in all regressions of panel (B). 
 
TABLE V  
Summary Statistics - The 1848-1868 Population Census Samples 
 Individual-Level District-Level  
 Copts Muslims Total Total 
District's Share of Copts in 1848-1868 0.17 
(0.10) 
0.06 
(0.08) 
0.07 
(0.08) 
0.06 
(0.08) 
=1 if average poll tax high in district in 641-
1100 (11 districts; 2682 individuals) 
0.42 
(0.49) 
0.71 
(0.45) 
0.67 
(0.47) 
0.73 
(0.47) 
=1 if Arab settlement in district in 700-969 0.46 
(0.50) 
0.71 
(0.46) 
0.69 
(0.46) 
0.64 
(0.48) 
Log (urban population) in 300 9.87 
(0.92) 
9.92 
(0.68) 
9.91 
(0.70) 
9.96 
(0.71) 
=1 if district on Holy Family route in 400 0.29 
(0.45) 
0.32 
(0.47) 
0.32 
(0.46) 
0.28 
(0.45) 
Percentage of Villages with at least one 
Coptic monastery in 1200 
0.06 
(0.10) 
0.04 
(0.08) 
0.04 
(0.08) 
0.04 
(0.08) 
=1 if an Autopract estate in district in 600 (35 
districts; 6792 individuals) 
0.68 
(0.47) 
0.67 
(0.47) 
0.67 
(0.47) 
0.66 
(0.48) 
=1 if Byzantine garrison in district in 600 0.24 
(0.43) 
0.30 
(0.46) 
0.29 
(0.45) 
0.30 
(0.46) 
Observations 1121 15520 16641 76 
Source: The 1848-1868 census samples combined with other data sources. See sections A1.1, A1.4, 
A1.7, A1.8, A1.9, and A1.10 in the online appendix for details. Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
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TABLE VI  
 Poll Tax, Arab Settlement, and Copts' Population Share in 1848-1868 - OLS Estimates 
Dependent Variable =1 if Coptic Christian 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
=1 if average poll tax high in 
district in 641-1100 
-0.163*** 
(0.043) 
-0.281** 
(0.099) 
-0.551* 
(0.275) 
-0.176*** 
(0.030) 
-0.617* 
(0.320) 
     
=1 if Arab settlement in 
district in 700-969 
     -0.071** 
(0.029) 
-0.074*** 
(0.028) 
-0.079** 
(0.036) 
-0.057*** 
(0.020) 
-0.091*** 
(0.026) 
Controls for urbanization and 
religiosity? 
No 
 
Yes Yes No 
 
Yes No 
 
Yes Yes No 
 
Yes 
Other controls? No No Yes No Yes No No Yes No Yes 
Province of origin FE?  No No No Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes 
Number of districts 11 11 11 11 11 76 76 35 76 35 
Observations 2682 2682 2682 2682 2682 16641 16641 6792 16641 6792 
Adjusted R2 0.047 0.058 0.060 0.057 0.075 0.017 0.017 0.020 0.078 0.053 
Source: The 1848-1868 population census samples combined with multiple data sources. See sections A1.1, A1.4, A1.7, A1.8, A1.9, and A1.10 in the online appendix 
for details. Standard errors clustered at district level are in parentheses. * p-value < 0.1, ** p-value < 0.05, *** p-value < 0.01. A constant is included in all regressions. 
 
TABLE VII  
 Poll Tax, Arab Settlement, and the Coptic-Muslim Occupational Differences in 1848-1868 - OLS Estimates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 =1 if 
White-
Collar1 
=1 if 
White-
Collar2 
=1 if 
White-
Collar3 
=1 if 
Professi-
onal 
=1 if 
High 
Bureau-
cracy 
=1 if Mid 
Bureau-
cracy 
=1 if 
Judiciary, 
Military 
=1 if 
Clergy, 
Rural 
Elite 
=1 if 
Merchant 
=1 if 
Artisan 
=1 if 
Farmer 
=1 if 
Unskilled 
Panel (A): Average Poll Tax High in District in 641-1100 Indicator - No Controls 
=1 if Copt 0.087*** 
(0.014) 
0.003 
(0.015) 
0.010 
(0.024) 
-0.005** 
(0.002) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.092*** 
(0.015) 
-0.029*** 
(0.001) 
-0.055*** 
(0.014) 
0.007 
(0.010) 
0.151** 
(0.049) 
-0.061 
(0.039) 
-0.100* 
(0.048) 
Copt * Poll tax 0.074* 
(0.039) 
0.129*** 
(0.034) 
0.097* 
(0.044) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
-0.003* 
(0.002) 
0.074* 
(0.040) 
-0.018*** 
(0.004) 
0.073** 
(0.024) 
-0.032* 
(0.015) 
0.110 
(0.137) 
-0.143 
(0.166) 
-0.063 
(0.057) 
Copt * Controls? No No No No No No No No No No No No 
District of origin FE?  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Districts 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 
Observations 2682 2682 2682 2682 2682 2682 2682 2682 2682 2682 2682 2682 
Adjusted R2 0.072 0.026 0.016 -0.002 0.001 0.097 0.036 0.018 0.009 0.065 0.056 0.035 
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Panel (B): Average Poll Tax High in District in 641-1100 Indicator - With Controls 
=1 if Copt 0.875 
(0.606) 
-1.278 
(0.973) 
0.928 
(1.019) 
0.052 
(0.044) 
-0.007 
(0.029) 
0.830 
(0.564) 
-0.294* 
(0.153) 
-1.859*** 
(0.351) 
2.206*** 
(0.055) 
6.541** 
(2.723) 
-7.618***  
(0.272) 
0.150 
(1.882) 
Copt * Poll tax 0.349** 
(0.155) 
0.032 
(0.221) 
0.439* 
(0.233) 
0.011 
(0.009) 
-0.001 
(0.006) 
0.339** 
(0.148) 
-0.050 
(0.033) 
-0.267*** 
(0.070) 
0.406*** 
(0.015) 
1.701*** 
(0.533) 
-2.268***  
(0.155) 
0.129 
(0.391) 
Copt * Controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
District of origin FE?  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Districts 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 
Observations 2682 2682 2682 2682 2682 2682 2682 2682 2682 2682 2682 2682 
Adjusted R2 0.081 0.026 0.018 -0.003 -0.001 0.111 0.034 0.019 0.011 0.089 0.077 0.037 
Panel (C): Arab Settlement in District in 700-969 Indicator - No Controls 
=1 if Copt 0.104*** 
(0.021) 
0.038 
(0.023) 
0.056* 
(0.032) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.002* 
(0.001) 
0.107*** 
(0.022) 
-0.022*** 
(0.005) 
-0.045*** 
(0.008) 
0.018 
(0.012) 
0.212*** 
(0.033) 
-0.158*** 
(0.049) 
-0.110*** 
(0.040) 
Copt * Arab settlement 0.153*** 
(0.055) 
0.183*** 
(0.064) 
0.151** 
(0.070) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
0.157*** 
(0.055) 
-0.004 
(0.008) 
0.035** 
(0.016) 
-0.032** 
(0.015) 
-0.059 
(0.058) 
-0.037 
(0.093) 
-0.055 
(0.046) 
Copt * Controls? No No No No No No No No No No No No 
District of origin FE?  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Districts 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 
Observations 16641 16641 16641 16641 16641 16641 16641 16641 16641 16641 16641 16641 
Adjusted R2 0.087 0.035 0.028 0.002 0.004 0.116 0.035 0.011 0.017 0.039 0.105 0.060 
Panel (D): Arab Settlement in District in 700-969 Indicator - With Controls 
=1 if Copt 0.051 
(0.213) 
-0.166 
(0.280) 
-0.060 
(0.297) 
-0.006 
(0.016) 
0.026 
(0.019) 
0.031 
(0.218) 
-0.092*** 
(0.026) 
-0.125 
(0.087) 
0.106* 
(0.058) 
-0.438* 
(0.239) 
0.157 
(0.423) 
0.342* 
(0.173) 
Copt * Arab settlement 0.098 
(0.069) 
0.082 
(0.087) 
0.080 
(0.089) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.003 
(0.002) 
0.101 
(0.071) 
-0.018*** 
(0.006) 
0.002 
(0.022) 
-0.002 
(0.011) 
-0.122* 
(0.061) 
0.102 
(0.124) 
-0.060 
(0.045) 
Copt * Controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
District of origin FE?  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Districts 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 
Observations 6792 6792 6792 6792 6792 6792 6792 6792 6792 6792 6792 6792 
Adjusted R2 0.062 0.024 0.024 0.001 0.006 0.083 0.047 0.015 0.015 0.063 0.109 0.068 
Source: The 1848-1868 population census samples combined with multiple data sources. See sections A1.1, A1.4, A1.7, A1.8, A1.9, and A1.10 in the online appendix 
for details. Standard errors clustered at the district of origin level are in parentheses. * p-value < 0.1, ** p-value < 0.05, *** p-value < 0.01.
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FIGURE I 
De Jure Poll Tax in 701-1856  
 
 
 
Source: See section A1.6 in the online appendix. 
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FIGURE II 
De Jure Poll Tax Rate and Wages in 661-1517 
 
Source: See section A1.6 in the online appendix. Fitted regression lines are as follows (robust standard 
errors are in parentheses): (1) 661-969: y = - 0.011 (0.001) + 10.187 (0.911) x [N = 35; R2 = 0.59]; (2) 
969-1250: y = - 0.011 (0.002) + 9.666 (1.310) x [N = 77; R2 = 0.32]; (3) 1250-1517: y = - 0.003 (0.000) 
+ 2.228 (0.235) x [N = 60; R2 = 0.47]. 
 
FIGURE III 
Islamization of Egypt in 641-1868 
 
Source: See text and section A1.4 in the online appendix. 
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FIGURE IV 
The Marginal Effects of the Poll Tax in a Static Environment 
  
Source: See text. 
FIGURE V 
The Spatial Distribution of the Key Variables 
 
Holding religiosity constant, as the poll 
tax (𝜏) increases, the threshold income 
level of conversion (𝑦∗) shifts to the 
right. Hence, Copts’ population share 
goes down and the (truncated) average 
incomes for Copts and converts 
(Muslims) both go up. If 𝑓(𝑦) is 
everywhere decreasing (e.g. Pareto), the 
Coptic-Muslim income gap increases. 
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Source: Panel (A) is from the papyri poll tax registers and receipts in 641-1100, Panel (B) is from the 
data on Arab settlement in 700-969, and Panels (C) and (D) are from the 1848-1868 population 
census samples. The Coptic-Muslim SES gap is the difference between Copts and Muslims in the 
population share of professionals and bureaucrats (white-collar1 = 1). See sections A1.1, A1.7, A1.8, 
and A1.10 in the online appendix for details. 
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RELIGION, AND SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS 
Mohamed Saleh 
December 22, 2015 
 
Abstract 
The appendix is divided into three parts. First, I describe the data sources that are 
employed throughout the paper. Second, I present the results of the robustness 
checks besides additional results that are omitted from the paper due to space 
limitations. Third, I present the proofs of the conceptual framework. 
 
A1. Data Sources 
A1.1. Egypt’s 1848 and 1868 Population Census Samples 
The 1848 and 1868 population censuses are among the earliest pre-Colonial 
individual-level population censuses from any non-Western country to enumerate all 
household members, including females, children, and slaves. They contain 
information on a wide range of variables including place of residence, name, gender, 
age, relationship to household head, nationality, ethnicity, free/slave status, religion, 
place of origin, occupation, school enrollment (for male children), and dwelling 
ownership and type (available in cities only). I digitized a nationally representative 
sample of each census (about 80,000 individuals in each sample) from the original 
Arabic manuscripts at the National Archives of Egypt. The sampling rate is 8-10 
percent in Egypt’s two major cities, Cairo and Alexandria, and 1 percent in all the 
other provinces. More details about the sampling strategy are in Saleh (2013). 
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I pooled the samples from both years and restricted the analysis to Egyptian local 
free Coptic and Muslim active men of a rural origin who are at least 15 years of age 
with non-missing values on age, religion, occupation, and district of origin. The 
sample restrictions aim at limiting the sample to the likely descendants of Egypt’s 
pre-641 population who either converted to Islam or remained Coptic Christian. (1) I 
restricted the sample to “Egyptians,” or individuals who are listed in the census 
manuscripts as dakhil al-hukuma (under the control of the Egyptian government); this 
excludes all foreigners such as Turks, Levantines, Armenians, Ottoman Greeks, 
North Africans, Asians, Americans, and Europeans. (2) I further restricted the 
sample to “locals,” which excludes certain groups of “Egyptians” who are not 
originally from the Nile Delta or the Nile Valley to the north of Nubia, namely, Arab 
Bedouins, Nubians, Sudanese, and Abyssinians.1 (3) I included only individuals of a 
rural origin. An individual’s place of origin in the census manuscripts refers to the 
origin of the individual’s family, i.e. it is not necessarily the place of birth. This 
restriction excludes individuals whose family origin is in major cities and deserts thus 
mitigating the potential cross-district movement of an individual’s ancestors in 641-
1868 under the presumption that most migration was towards cities.2  
In order to construct the occupational outcomes, I first manually translated and 
coded all the occupational titles in the census manuscripts following the coding of 
the Historical International Standard Classification of Occupations (HISCO). I then 
classified each occupational code into one of nine categories: (1) professionals, (2) 
high-level bureaucrats, (3) mid-low bureaucrats, (4) the judiciary, (5) the 
military/police, (6) the clergy and the rural elites, (7) artisans, (8) farmers, and (9) 
unskilled workers. The first six categories comprise the three white-collar indicators. 
                                                          
1 Arab Bedouins (‘orban) in the 1848-1868 census samples are likely (descendants of) the Arab tribes 
that immigrated to Egypt during the eighteenth century. That was the second large wave of Arab 
settlement in Egypt after the first post-Conquest wave in 700-969 that I exploit in the paper. 
2 Specifically, I excluded individuals whose family origin is in major cities (Cairo, Alexandria, Rosetta, 
and Damietta) and deserts (Al-Arish, Al-Qusayr, and the Western Desert Oases). Children in the 1848 
census, but not in the 1868 census, inherit their fathers’ place of origin (Saleh, 2013). 
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A1.2. Estimating the Coptic-Muslim Difference in Adult Mortality 
(Life Expectancy) from the 1848-1868 Population Census Samples 
The handbook of the UN Population Division (2002, pp. 5-20) outlines a 
methodology for estimating adult mortality from any two consecutive censuses, with 
an interval of x years, where x is a multiple of 5. The methodology uses the relative 
sizes of age cohorts, defined in groups of 5-year intervals, in the two censuses in 
order to estimate the probability of survival to an age y + x, conditional on being of 
age y in the first census. A slightly different methodology, the synthetic survival ratio, 
calculates the growth rate of each age cohort in order to make the methodology 
applicable to any census interval, i.e. not necessarily a multiple of 5. I applied the two 
methods to the census samples of 1848 and 1868, in order to estimate the adult 
mortality by religious group. A few caveats arise though: (a) the time interval 
separating the two Egyptian censuses (20 years) is too long to apply the two 
methodologies; ideally, the interval should be around 5 or 10 years, (b) I do not have 
100-percent samples of the two censuses, and hence, there is a sampling error in 
estimating the size of the age cohorts, and (c) there is a problem of age misreporting; 
in particular, age heaping and age exaggeration, which is typical in historical censuses 
and even in contemporary censuses in developing countries. Age misreporting is 
likely correlated with the SES and may hence differ in a non-random way across 
religious groups, where Muslims are more likely to misreport their true age. In order 
to mitigate age misreporting, I defined age groups in intervals of 10 years instead of 5 
years. The estimation results are shown in Table (A.1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
44 
 
TABLE A.1 
Estimating Adult Mortality from the 1848-1868 Census Samples 
 
  Age Group Estimated Size 
in 1848 
Estimated Size 
in 1868 
Estimated Life 
Expectancy 
(Method 1) 
Estimated Life 
Expectancy 
(Method 2) 
Copts 
0-9 90,740 117,801 NA NA 
10-19 32,981 51,600 41.45 42.90 
20-29 33,290 52,466 44.59 44.59 
30-39 40,100 36,657 30.44 32.20 
40-49 27,031 26,187 25.46 24.72 
50-59 15,325 25,345 22.61 21.02 
60-69 11,406 12,595 17.67 16.10 
70-79 7,849 10,899 11.52 9.03 
80+ 7,094 5,107 NA NA 
Muslims 
0-9 1,148,827 1,458,614 NA NA 
10-19 377,685 603,264 43.44 44.82 
20-29 406,293 622,071 49.08 48.73 
30-39 457,208 481,535 32.97 32.65 
40-49 348,101 360,926 25.90 23.79 
50-59 243,063 288,588 21.83 19.98 
60-69 171,180 195,387 16.88 13.53 
70-79 99,442 111,561 12.26 8.68 
80+ 125,336 78,559 NA NA 
Source: The 1848-1868 population census samples. See sections 3.2 in the main text and sections A1.1 
and A1.2 in the online appendix for details on the data source. 
 
A1.3. Data on Religion and Occupations in 641-969 from 
the Arabic Papyrology Database (APD) 
A1.3.1. Data Construction 
Arabic papyri documents, most of which were discovered since the late 
nineteenth century in Egypt’s dry-climate Nile Valley, remain a mostly unpublished 
source of information on the micro-level characteristics of the medieval populations 
of the Middle East, especially Egypt, during the early Islamic period in 641-969. An 
ongoing research project entitled the Arabic Papyrology Database (henceforth, APD) 
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attempts at the digitization of all Arabic papyri that were ever published.3 There are 
various types of documents in the APD, namely, (1) protocols, (2) legal texts (e.g. 
marriage and sale contracts), (3) administrative texts (e.g. official letters, lists, and 
accounts), (4) private texts (e.g. private and business letters), and (5) literary texts.4 
I used all papyri documents in the APD in order to construct an individual-level 
dataset on occupational titles and religious affiliation, where I inferred a worker’s 
religion from his name because converts adopted an Arabic name upon conversion 
to Islam.5 Basically, I included in the sample every male mentioned in any APD 
document with a non-missing name and occupational title. 
A few important notes on the APD sample construction are in order: 
(1) Because the occupational title of “landholding farmer” is almost never 
mentioned in the papyri (a landless farmer, or ‘agir, is explicitly mentioned though), I 
inferred if a male with a non-missing name is a landholding farmer if he is recorded 
as paying a positive land tax in the papyri land tax registers and receipts. Notice that 
the vast majority of farmers in Egypt were landholding farmers who were assigned 
land plots on which they held usufruct rights and paid a positive land tax. 
(2) Because my goal is to compare Copts to Egyptian Muslims (converts), I ideally 
want to exclude non-Egyptian Muslims (mainly, Arabs and Turks) from the sample. 
For this purpose, I excluded individuals in top government posts, namely, Caliphs, 
viceroys, and top government administrators, who were certainly Arab settlers in 
641-969. I am unable though to identify all Arab settlers because converts adopted 
Arabic names upon conversion. 
                                                          
3Out of more than 150,000 Arabic papyri that were ever discovered, there are only 2,500 documents 
(less than 2 percent) that were published since 1900. The APD, which was launched in 2004, has, as 
of April 2015, digitized 2,068 documents or about 83 percent of the published papyri. 
4 Papyrus is a material of writing that was most prevalent in Egypt until 969. The APD documents are 
written on various writing materials besides papyrus including paper, ostracon, woodtable, waxtable, 
stone, parchment, leather, bone, and textile. All those documents are included in the APD sample. 
5 An extant administrative list of new converts in 700-900 reveals that a convert had to adopt an 
Arabic name upon conversion and to become a client of an Arab patron (Morimoto 1981, p. 131). 
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(3) Although there are APD documents in 969-1517, I restricted the sample to 
641-969 because (a) there are fewer papyri after 969, the year of the Fatimid 
Conquest of Egypt, as paper increasingly replaced papyrus as the writing material and 
(b) most Copts’ conversions to Islam took place by 680, or, at the latest, by 1200, 
and thus the early Islamic period is arguably the most important to examine. 
(4) I inferred religious affiliation from names only. In particular, I chose to not use 
any other contextual information, such as occupation, in the inference of religion in 
order to mitigate non-random measurement error. Moreover, I only included males 
with names that are certainly Muslim or Christian based on the list of names in the 
1848-1868 census samples and on papyrologists’ interpretations of the papyri. 
These procedures resulted in a final sample of 402 males with religious affiliation 
and occupational titles in 641-969. This is the sample that I used in Table (III). 
A1.3.2. Addressing the Concerns about the APD Sample 
There are at least three concerns about the APD sample. First, there is a concern 
about the national representativeness of the sample, because (a) it may be non-
random on location; 65 percent of the sample is from unknown locations inside 
Egypt, 34 percent from the Nile Valley, and only less than one percent comes from 
the (more humid) Nile Delta and (b) it may be non-random on SES, because it likely 
over-represents males of high SES who had a higher chance of appearance in the 
papyri. Second, I may misidentify Copts, since I cannot tell if a non-Muslim name is 
Coptic, non-Coptic Christian, or Jewish, and, similarly, I may misidentify converts, 
since I cannot tell if a Muslim name is a descendant of a Coptic convert or of an 
Arab/Turkish settler. Third, there is an error in observing occupations as I inferred if 
an individual is a landholding farmer from the incidence of payment of a land tax. 
While I cannot rule out these concerns, there are arguments that mitigate each of 
them. (1) On the first concern, even if the APD sample is mostly from the Nile 
Valley (which is not necessarily the case because location is missing in 65 percent of 
the sample), the 1848-1868 population census samples reveal that the Nile Valley had 
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a higher Copts’ population share and a smaller, yet positive and statistically 
significant, Coptic-Muslim SES difference than the Nile Delta. Hence, the APD 
sample would, if anything, underestimate the true Coptic-Muslim SES difference. More 
important, 72 percent of the APD sample is from administrative documents, namely, 
lists (54 percent) and receipts of payment (18 percent). Those are arguably neutral 
documents in which every individual has an equal chance of appearance. And while 
the remaining 28 percent of the sample is from contracts (sale, lease, marriage, 
divorce, and written obligation contracts) and private and business letters, where 
selection-on-SES is more likely, the statistics in Table (III) do not change if I limit 
the sample to the administrative lists and receipts. Finally, even if the APD sample is 
not representative of the population share of each occupational outcome within each 
religious group, it may be still representative of the Coptic-Muslim difference in the 
population share of each occupational outcome if non-random selection is the same 
within each group. 
(2) On the second concern, non-Muslims in the APD sample are almost certainly 
Copts because those were the vast majority of non-Muslims (about 96 percent of 
Christians in 1200, based on the dataset on Christian churches and monasteries that I 
describe in section A1.4) and because non-Coptic Christians and Jews rarely settled 
in the Nile Valley where 34 percent of the APD sample is from.6  On the other hand, 
even if I misidentify Arab/Turkish settlers as Egyptian converts, this would in fact 
overestimate the share of high-SES workers among converts since Arab/Turkish 
settlers in 641-969 were more likely to be in high-SES occupations as they were the 
political elite. That would in turn underestimate the true Coptic-Muslim SES difference. 
(3) On the third concern, the share of males who are assigned as landholding 
farmers within each religious group in the APD sample is similar to the share of 
                                                          
6 Jews were mostly urban and Mikhail (2004, p. 134) states that there is neither literary nor 
documentary evidence on the Melkites’ (non-Coptic Christians) presence in the Nile Valley in the post-
Conquest period. In 1200, 91 percent of the non-Coptic (Melkite and Armenian) Christian churches 
and monasteries were in the Nile Delta and in major cities (Cairo, Alexandria, and Damietta). 
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landholding farmers within each religious group in the 1848-1868 population census 
samples, which may lend support to the procedure of inferring the “landholding 
farmer” occupation from paying a positive land tax. 
A1.3.3. Historical Evidence on the Findings in Table (III) 
The occupational differences that are documented in Table (III) are supported by 
historical evidence. Copts’ over-representation in the mid-low bureaucracy from 641 
to, at least, 1900 is well documented in history (Tagher, 1998 [1951]; Sheikho, 1987; 
Samir, 1996; Amer, 2000). According to Tagher (1998 [1951], p. 142), “the condition of 
the Copt did not change during the six centuries preceding [the nineteenth century]… His 
work, tax collecting, was the basis of his existence and his only hope to accumulate wealth.” Circa 
1000, Al-Muqaddasi (1877, p. 183) noted that, “scribes in the Levant and Egypt are 
Christians.” A millennium later, Lord Cromer, the British Consul of Egypt (1883-
1908), observed that, “when the English took Egyptian affairs in hand, the accountants in the 
employment of the Egyptian government were almost exclusively Copts,” (Tagher, 1998 [1951], 
p. 213). Historical evidence also indicates that Copts’ advantage over Muslims was 
not limited to the mid-low bureaucracy. Raymond (1973, pp. 456-59) lists the artisanal 
occupations where Copts were over-represented in eighteenth-century Cairo, namely, 
carpenters, tailors, and weavers, which is essentially the same set of occupations that 
I observe among Coptic artisans in 641-969 and in 1848-1868. As for Muslims, the 
political/religious white-collar jobs were restricted to them by Islamic law, although 
those were not necessarily accessible to converts. There is also historical evidence 
that Muslims were over-represented in commerce. Under the Mamluks in 1250-1517, 
for example, all merchants of spices were Muslims (Tsugitaka, 2006). 
A1.4. Data on Churches and Monasteries in 1200 and 1500  
A1.4.1. Data Construction 
I constructed a village-level dataset on the number of Christian (both Coptic and 
non-Coptic) churches and monasteries in 1200 and 1500 from two independent 
medieval sources, (1) Abul-Makarim (1984 [1200])’s History of Churches and Monasteries, 
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who provides a comprehensive list of Christian churches and monasteries in Egypt at 
the end of the twelfth century, and (2) Al-Maqrizi (2002 [1500])’s Sermons and 
Considerations in Examining Plans and Monuments, who lists Christian churches and 
monasteries in Egypt in the fifteenth century.7 
Both sources list the location of Christian churches and monasteries at the village 
level, which is smaller than districts in 1848-1868. I matched the villages in both 
sources to the villages in 1848-1868 according to the administrative division of the 
1897 census, where I either manually searched for those villages in 1897 or referred 
to Ramzi (1994 [1954]). I was therefore able to calculate the number of Coptic and 
non-Coptic Christian churches and monasteries in each village in 1200 and 1500.  
I used this dataset in order to construct three variables. (1) The share of villages in 
all Egypt with at least one Christian church or monastery in 1200 and 1500 (both 
Coptic and non-Coptic), which I used as an estimate of Egypt’s non-Muslims’ 
population share in 1200 and 1500 in Figure (III), under the presumption that a 
village with at least one Christian church/monastery is 100 percent non-Muslim and 
that a village without any church or monastery is 100 percent Muslim. I 
supplemented these estimates by the 1848-1868 census samples where non-Muslims 
were around 7 percent of the population. (2) The share of villages in each district 
with at least one Coptic church or monastery in 1200 and 1500, which I used as an 
estimate of the medieval Copts’ population share in each district in the robustness 
checks in section 4.6.3 [Table (A.7)]. (3) The share of villages in each district with at 
least one Coptic monastery in 1200, which I used as a control variable in the 
empirical analysis [Tables (VI) and (VII)] in order to control for the pre-641 
                                                          
7 There are two versions of Abul-Makarim’s book. The first is The Churches and Monasteries of Egypt and 
Some Neighboring Countries that was edited by Evetts and was first published in an English translation 
from the original Arabic manuscript in 1895 where it was wrongly attributed to “Abu-Saleh, the 
Armenian.” That version lists Christian churches and monasteries in the Nile Valley only. The second 
version, which I use in the paper, is by Anba-Samuel, who edited a two-volume version of the book in 
1984. The first volume includes the missing part of the book about the Nile Delta, whereas the 
second volume is a re-publication of Evetts’ book on the Nile Valley. The book is now believed to 
belong to the twelfth-century Coptic chronicler, Abul-Makarim. 
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generosity of the intra-Coptic transfers. The denominator in all three measures, the 
total number of villages, whether in all Egypt or in each district, was computed as of 
1477 in order to mitigate the concern about the possible emergence of new villages 
between 1200 (or 1500) and 1848-1868. That was based on Ramzi (1994 [1954])’s list 
of “old” (i.e. pre-1477) and “new” (i.e. post-1477) villages, which is in turn based on 
a Mamluk cadastral survey that was published in Ibn Al-Jay’an’s (1477) al-tuhfa al-
saniya bi asmaa’ al-bilad al-misriya (List of Names of Egyptian Localities). 
A1.4.2. The Data’s Contribution to the Historical Literature 
The dataset makes two contributions to the historical literature. First, it 
contributes to a long-standing debate on the timing of Egypt’s Islamization. Second, 
it allows me to trace the composition of Egypt’s Christian population among Copts 
and non-Coptic Christians in 1200-1868, which, when combined with other pieces of 
evidence, helps to document the evolution of the composition of the entire non-
Muslim population in 641-1868. Below, I discuss each of these contributions. 
A1.4.2.1. The Historical Debate on Egypt’s Islamization 
There are no statistics on Egypt’s religious composition before 1897, the year of 
the first published population census with information on religious affiliation (this is 
apart from the 1848 and 1868 unpublished population census manuscripts of which I 
digitized nationally representative samples). Yet, there is a consensus on a number of 
historical facts. Christianity reached Egypt in the first century and the Church of 
Alexandria was a major theological center since the second century (Bowman, 1989, 
pp. 191-202). The last pocket of paganism in Egypt was Christianized in the mid-
sixth century (Bowman, 1989, p. 192). The Coptic Christian Church of Alexandria, 
followed by the Egyptian masses, separated from the Byzantine church because of a 
theological debate in 451 (Tagher, 1998 [1951], pp. 1-7; Atiya, 2005, pp. 71-76). Yet, 
Greeks and Hellenized Egyptians remained loyal to the Byzantine church forming a 
parallel church, the Melkite Church of Alexandria. Condemned as heretics by the 
Byzantines, Copts suffered from persecution until the Arab Conquest in 639-641 
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(Bowman, 1989, p. 198; Atiya, 2005, pp. 87-99). Hence, on the eve of the Conquest, 
Coptic Christians constituted the vast majority of Egypt's population, whereas non-
Coptic Christians (mostly, Melkites) and Jews formed two small minorities (Lane-
Poole, 1969, p. 2; Tagher, 1998 [1951], p. 4; Wilfong, 1998, p. 175).8 During the 
twelve and a half centuries that followed the Arab Conquest, Non-Muslims shrank 
from 100 percent of the population in 641 to 7 percent in 1897. 
Determining the date at which non-Muslims shrank into a minority is a very old 
debate in Egyptian history since at least the work of the renowned fifteenth-century 
Egyptian historian, Al-Maqrizi. There are two viewpoints on this debate. One 
tradition (Al-Maqrizi, 2002 [1500]; Dennett, 1950; Lane-Poole, 1969; Mikhail, 2004) 
argued that Egypt was Islamized by the ninth century because of the suppression of 
the Coptic tax revolts that erupted between 726 and 866. Another tradition (Wiet, 
1927; Little, 1976; El-Leithy, 2005; Werthmuller, 2010) argued, to the contrary, that 
Copts remained in the majority until the fourteenth century, where an unprecedented 
wave of state persecution triggered mass conversions to Islam among Copts.  
Apart from this unresolved debate, there are two quantitative studies on the 
subject. First, Bulliet (1979) used lineages of a sample of prominent individuals in the 
medieval narratives in order to identify the date at which an individual’s ancestors 
converted to Islam and adopted an Arabic name. He found that conversions peaked 
in the ninth century. Second, Courbage and Fargues (1997, pp. 27-28) used total poll 
and land tax revenues in order to estimate the share of the non-Muslim population in 
641-813. My estimates in 1200 and 1500, shown in Figure (III), are consistent with 
those of Courbage and Fargues and are supportive of the first historical tradition. 
A1.4.2.2. The Composition of Egypt’s Non-Muslim Population in 641-1868 
The dataset on Christian churches and monasteries allows me to trace the 
composition of the Christian population in 1200 and 1500. The data indicate that in 
                                                          
8 Non-Coptic Christians before 641 were mostly Melkites. There were also other minor non-Coptic 
and non-Melkite Christian factions before 641 that were later assimilated into either the Coptic or the 
Melkite Churches (Mikhail, 2004, pp. 46, 48). 
52 
 
both 1200 and 1500, only 4 percent of those institutions were non-Coptic, mostly, 
Melkite and Armenian. This is equal to the percentage of non-Coptic Christians out 
of the total Christian population in the 1848-1868 census samples, which indicates 
that their share relative to Copts persisted in 1200-1868. However, the ethnic 
composition of non-Coptic Christians expanded in 1848-1868 beyond Melkites and 
Armenians, to include Greeks, Levantines, and Europeans. 
Tracing the composition of the entire non-Muslim population in 641-1868, 
however, requires estimating the population shares (out of non-Muslims) of Jews in 
641-1868 and of non-Coptic Christians in 641-1200, for which further evidence is 
needed. First, Jews were a “small” minority in 641 and constituted 2 percent of non-
Muslims in 1848-1868, which suggests that their share out of all non-Muslims was 
stable in 641-1868. Second, historical evidence suggests that non-Coptic Christians’ 
share out of all non-Muslims in 641 was similar to their share in 1200.9 
Hence, one may conclude that non-Coptic Christians and Jews remained two 
small minority groups of Egypt’s non-Muslim population in 641, 1200, 1500, and in 
1848-1868. That indicates that each of the two groups witnessed in 641-1868 a 
decline in its share out of Egypt’s total population that was similar to the rate of 
decline in Copts’ population share. However, because in- and out-migration waves 
among non-Coptic Christians and Jews were more frequent (in contrast to Copts), it 
is unlikely that the decline in their shares is attributable to conversions alone. 
A1.5. Taxes and Benefits in 641-1856 [Table (I)] 
The composition of taxes and benefits in Table (I) is based on Morimoto (1981, 
pp. 51, 140, 257-263), Rabie (1972, pp. 73-132), Ismail (1998, pp. 153-208), and 
Mahmoud (2009). The actual tax system in 641-750 may have deviated though from 
that depicted in Table (I) before jurists established the canonical form of Islamic 
taxation around 750. There are three sources of this deviation: 
                                                          
9 There were only 7 Melkite churches in Egypt in 600 (Mikhail 2004, p. 48). 
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(1) Although converts in 641-750 were in principle exempted from the poll tax 
and were subject to a reduced land tax (tithe, ushur) that was less than half of the 
kharaj tax on Coptic landholders (Frantz-Murphy 1999, p. 238), Muslim rulers, 
confronted by sharp declines in the tax revenues due to widespread conversions, 
often did not exempt converts from the poll and kharaj taxes during that period, with 
the reduced ushur tax being only applied to Arabs (Morimoto, 1981, pp. 66-91).  
(2) It is not certain that the zakat tax on rich Muslims was actually enforced in 
641-750. Sijpesteijn (2013, pp. 181-99) argues that the institutionalization of the zakat 
as a tax paid to the state rather than an informal transfer paid directly by rich 
Muslims to poor Muslims might have only occurred around 750. Another viewpoint 
argues that the zakat was first institutionalized under Saladin in 1174-1193. 
(3) It is not certain if the poll and kharaj land taxes in 641-750 were the same or 
different taxes due to the confusion in medieval narratives and papyri tax documents 
in 641-750 over the usage of the two Arabic terms for the poll and land taxes, jizya 
and kharaj. Faced by this confusion, earlier historians such as Wellhausen, Becker, 
Grohmann, and Bell argued that the two taxes were synonyms where they simply 
meant a tribute collected from the village as a whole, rather than two distinct 
individual taxes, and that the distinction occurred only later on with the fiscal reform 
of 720. Dennett (1950, pp. 62-103) argued, to the contrary, that the distinction 
existed since 641 and that both taxes were individual taxes. Kosei Morimoto 
attempted to reconcile the two viewpoints by arguing that the individual-level 
assessment of the poll and land taxes, which is manifested in the papyri tax records, 
was the basis for estimating each community’s tribute. In my view, the papyri tax 
records provide decisive evidence that both taxes were collected individually and 
were distinct taxes since 641 [see the discussion in Morimoto (1981, pp. 51-57)]. 
A1.6. Data on the De Jure Poll Tax and Wages in 641-1517 
The de jure annual nominal poll tax amounts in Panel (A) of Figure (I) are based 
on (1) Muslim jurists’ handbooks in 701-1100 [Abu-Youssef (1979, pp. 122-4) for the 
54 
 
Umayyad and Abbasid periods in 701-900 and Al-Qadi Al-Nu’man (1963, pp. 379-
381) for the Fatimid period in 900-1100], (2) governmental officials’ handbooks of 
administration in 1101-1700 [Ibn-Mamati (1991, p. 318) for the Ayyubid period in 
1101-1300 and Al-Qalqashandi (1914, p. 462) for the Mamluk and the early Ottoman 
periods in 1301-1700], and (3) Ottoman Egypt’s tax tabulations in 1701-1856 
[Mahmoud (2009a, pp. 112, 136)]. 
Two viewpoints prevailed among jurists regarding the poll tax amount. On the 
one hand, the Hanafi Sunni School (official under the Abbasids in 750-969 and the 
Ottomans in 1517-1856) and the Ismaili Shiite School (official under the Fatimids in 
969-1171) imposed the tax according to three income-brackets: one dinar on manual 
or low-income workers, two dinars on the middle-income, and four dinars on the 
rich (Hanafi: Abu-Youssef, 1979, pp. 122-4; Ismaili: Al-Qadi Al-Nu’man, 1963, pp. 
379-381). On the other hand, the Shafi’i Sunni School dictated that the tax was fixed 
at one dinar per person (Al-Shafi’i, 2001, pp. 423-30). Although the Ayyubids (1171-
1250) and the Mamluks (1250-1517) officially endorsed the Shafi’i School, they often 
adhered to the three-bracket formula (Mahmoud, 2009a; pp. 32-37). 
Relatedly, Muslim jurists disagreed as to the exemption of the poor from the poll 
tax. While the Hanafi Sunni School dictated that the poor were exempted from the 
tax, both the Ismaili Shiite and the Shafi’i Sunni schools did not grant such 
exemption. Using evidence from the Cairo Geniza on destitute Jews in Egypt who 
paid the poll tax, Goitein (1963) and Alshech (2003) argued that the Ayyubids 
applied the Shafi’i view. Importantly though, under both viewpoints any working adult 
male is considered non-poor and is thus not exempted from the poll tax. 
The nominal poll tax amounts in panel (A) of Figure (I) are in Islamic dinars 
weighing 4.25 grams of gold. Those dinars remained in circulation until they were 
replaced in 1425 with the Ashrafi dinars that weighed 3.45 grams. Since the nominal 
poll tax is recorded in each source in a different currency, I transformed the amounts 
into Islamic dinars in Panel (A) of Figure (I) as follows:  
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1. In 701-1100, I used the exchange rate of 12 Dirhams: 1 Dinar under the 
Umayyads and Abbasids (661-969) from Ashtor (1969, p. 77).  
2. In 1101-1300, I used the following exchange rates:  
a) 9 Dirhams: 1 Dinar under Saladin (1171-1193) in Ashtor (1969, p. 122). 
b) 24 Kirats: 1 Dinar from Zambaur (2013).  
c) 72 Habbas: 1 Dinar from Goitein (1967, p. 371). 
3. In 1301-1700, I used the exchange rate of 30 Dirhams: 1 Dinar under Barquq 
(1382-99) from Ashtor (1969, p. 277). 
4. In 1701-1800, I used the exchange rate of 45 Nisfs: 1 Sharifi Dinar in 1608 
from Mahmoud (2008, p. 112). The Sharifi Dinar weighed 3.45 grams of gold and is 
thus equivalent to 0.81 Islamic Dinars. 
5. In 1801-1856, I used the exchange rate of 6 Piasters: 1 Mahbub Dinar in 1807 
from Mahmoud (2009, p. 123). The Mahbub Dinar weighed 3.45 grams of gold and 
is thus equivalent to 0.81 Islamic Dinars. 
In order to translate the nominal annual poll tax amounts into real values in Panel 
(B), I adjusted the nominal amounts by the purchasing power of the dinar in ratls of 
bread as recorded in Ashtor (1969, p. 465). The ratl in Cairo weighed 450 grams. 
Panel (C) of Figure (I) plots the poll tax rate in 661-1517. I used Ashtor (1969, pp. 
90-4, 223-9, 372-81) in order to collect individual-level data on occupational titles 
and wages in each of the main periods in medieval Egypt’s history, where I classified 
each occupation into one of the three income-brackets according to the criteria in 
Abu-Youssef (1979, p. 122-4) and assigned to each occupational title the de jure poll 
tax amount that was in effect in each historical period. The de jure nominal annual 
poll tax amounts are taken from Abu-Youssef (1979, pp. 122-4) for the Umayyad 
and Abbasid period (661-969), Al-Qadi Al-Nu’man (1963, pp. 379-381) for the 
Fatimid period (969-1171), Ibn-Mamati (1991, p. 318) for the Ayyubid period (1171-
1250), and Al-Qalqashandi (1914, p. 462) for the Mamluk period (1250-1517). I then 
computed within each income bracket and period the average de jure annual poll tax 
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rate defined as the average de jure nominal annual poll tax divided by the average 
nominal annual wage. Those averages are plotted in Panel (C).  
Figure (II) plots the full scatterplot of the de jure poll tax rate (= de jure poll tax 
divided by wage) and wages in each historical period using the same dataset as above. 
A1.7. Data on Actual Poll Tax Payments in 641-1100 
I collected all the available information in the Greek and Arabic papyri sources on 
the individual-level annual nominal poll tax payments (in Islamic dinars) in 641-1100 
(N = 552). The location (kura) of the papyri document is only available for a smaller 
sample (N = 408) in four kuras in the Nile Valley. The data are from two sources: (1) 
Fragments of the Greek papyri poll tax registers of the kura of Qahqawa (pre-641, 
Aphrodito) in 703-733 in Morimoto (1981, pp. 67-79), and (2) Fragments of the 
Arabic papyri poll tax registers and receipts in the APD for the three kuras of Fayum 
(pre-641, Arsinoe) in 641-1005, Ihnas (pre-641, Herakleopolis) in 701-900, and Al-
Ashmunayn (pre-641, Hermopolis) in 731-1100. I depict the full distribution of the poll 
tax payments by kura in Figure (A.1). 
I used this dataset for three purposes. (1) I computed the average poll tax 
payment in each of the four kura in 641-1100, which I mapped into 11 districts in 
1848-1868, and I used, as the first measure of the poll tax in the empirical analysis, 
an indicator variable =1 if the average poll tax was “high” in the district (> 1.3 
dinars, the cross-district average). (2) Poll tax registers from three sub-districts in the 
kura of Qahqawa in 703-733 contain information on both the poll and total land 
taxes, which is the restricted sample (N = 230) that I used in Table (II). (3) I 
computed the national-level average poll tax payment using the full sample (N = 
552) which I mentioned in section 3.1.2. 
A1.8. Data on Arab Settlement in 700-969 
Data on Arab settlement are from Al-Barri (1992) who compiled information 
from the Arabic medieval sources (the most important source is Al-Maqrizi’s book 
on Egypt’s Arab tribes) in order to trace the destinations of the Arab tribes that 
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settled permanently in Egypt between 700 and 969. The destination is recorded at 
the kura level (in a few cases, the district could be identified). I focus on permanent 
Arab settlers and so I excluded the early seasonal migration (irtiba’) in 641-700.10 
A1.9. Data on the Pre-641 Control Variables 
1. Log (urban population) in 300 is from Wilson’s (2011, pp. 185-187). These are 
estimates of the population size of the Greek cities (metropolis) and the capital in each 
nome (Egypt’s administrative units in the Roman period) around 300. Wilson assigned 
a fixed population size for the capitals of all the other nomes that are not mentioned 
in his estimates. I used Wilson’s estimates at the nome level and mapped them into 
districts in 1848-1868 using the mapping routine that I outline in section A1.10. 
2. The legendary route of the Holy Family: I constructed a dummy variable =1 if 
a district is believed, according to the local Coptic traditions, to have been visited by 
the Holy Family during its legendary flight to Egypt after Jesus’ birth. I constructed 
this variable from the Holy Family path that is described in Anba-Bishoy (1999) and 
Gabra (2001). That is in turn based on a book attributed to Theophilus, the Patriarch 
of Alexandria in 385-412, and so it should reflect in principle the pre-641 local 
Coptic beliefs. The date of the book is debated though as some scholars believe that 
it was written in the fifteenth century, and thus it may in fact reflect the post-641 
Coptic local beliefs that were likely affected by the conversion process. There are two 
points that mitigate this concern though: (a) there is evidence that the local beliefs 
about the journey of the Holy Family, although not the specific path itself, emerged 
in as early as the Roman period, and (b) I use the Holy Family legendary route 
indicator as a control variable only and I show the results both with and without it.11  
                                                          
10 Irtiba’ is from rabi’, the Arabic word for “spring,” and refers to the Arabs’ policy in 641-700 
whereby Arab tribes were encouraged to settle temporarily during the spring season in any Egyptian 
village of their choice for grazing their animals. Egyptians (Copts) were required to provide them with 
food and shelter (Al-Barri, 1992, pp. 56-60) as part of the “miscellaneous taxes” in Table (I). 
11 The legendary flight of the Holy Family to Egypt is based on Matthew 13: “When they had gone, an 
angel of the Lord appeared to Joseph in a dream. “Get up,” he said, “take the child and his mother and escape to 
Egypt. Stay there until I tell you, for Herod is going to search for the child to kill him”.” The book which 
describes the path of the Holy Family journey in Egypt is entitled Vision of Theophilus. However, 
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Both sources record the places on the legendary route of the Holy Family at the 
village level and I was able to match those villages to the districts in 1848-1868 using 
Ramzi (1994 [1954]) and manual search in the list of villages of the 1897 census.  
3. The share of villages with at least one Coptic monastery in each district in 1200: 
I described the construction of this variable in section A1.4. Coptic monasteries 
leased out their landholdings to farmers (Richter, 2009) and provided loans and 
grants to poor Copts to help pay the poll and land taxes (Markiewicz, 2009). 
4. The large autopract estates in 600: I constructed this variable based on Hardy 
(1931), who traced the large agricultural estates in late Byzantine Egypt that were 
mentioned in the papyri and secondary sources. I restricted the sample to nomes in 
the Nile Valley, as the papyri were less likely to survive in the Delta. I then created an 
indicator variable at the nome level =1 if the nome had at least one large agricultural 
estate, which I then matched to districts in 1848-1868 (see section A1.10). 
5. Byzantine military garrisons in 600: I constructed an indicator variable =1 if the 
district had at least one Byzantine military garrison in 600 based on Maspero (1912). 
The author compiled information on the location of Byzantine military garrisons 
from primary sources. Locations are mentioned at a fine geographic level that 
allowed me to identify the district in 1848-1868 in which each garrison was located. 
A1.10. Mapping N om es  and Kura s  into Districts 
Nomes were Egypt’s administrative units since ancient times until 641, whereby 
Egypt was divided into about 40 nomes (20 in the Nile Valley and 20 in the Nile 
Delta). After the Arab Conquest of Egypt in 639-641, Egypt was re-divided into a 
larger number of kuras (about 50). In 1848-1868, Egypt was divided into provinces, 
where each province was divided into districts, and districts were divided into 
                                                                                                                                                               
Mingana (1931, pp. 3-4) argues that the book was written by Cyriacus, a Coptic bishop in the fifteenth 
century. Yet, there is evidence on the existence of local Coptic beliefs surrounding the journey of the 
Holy Family although not the specific path itself. The earliest post-biblical record of the flight of the 
Holy Family dates back to the third century and the event was recorded by historians and theologians 
in both the Roman and Byzantine periods. Whether the specific route was totally invented before the 
Arab Conquest or was rather altered throughout the centuries is impossible to tell though. 
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villages. Nomes and kuras were smaller in area than the nineteenth-century provinces 
but were larger than the districts (76 districts; excluding major cities and deserts).  
I mapped Nomes and kuras into districts in the 1848-1868 census samples using 
the 1897 census administrative division of districts that contains the list of villages 
under each district. The reason is that the 1848 and 1868 population censuses were 
never published and hence there is no official list indicating the villages under each 
district in these censuses. Therefore, I first matched each village in the 1848-1868 
census samples into its equivalent village in 1897 and thus assigned each village to a 
district in 1897. 
In the absence of information on the boundaries of nomes, the mapping of the 
pre-641 nomes into districts in 1897 was based on the mapping of the capital of each 
district in 1897 to the nome with the closest major town (in terms of distance). In 
order to carry out this matching, I first compiled the full list of nomes from 
http://www.trismegistos.org/geo/about_egyptiannomes.php; a specialized portal in 
papyri documents from Egypt in 800 BC - 800 CE. Second, I determined the current 
location of the major town of each nome using the mapping of nomes on Google Maps 
in http://www.trismegistos.org/.12 Finally, I matched each district in 1897 to the 
nearest nome based on the proximity of the capital of each district to the nome’s major 
town according to Google maps. 
Similarly, in the absence of information on the boundaries of the kuras, the 
mapping of the kuras into districts in 1897 was conducted using exactly the same 
routine. I first compiled the full list of kuras from Tousson (1926). Second, I 
determined the current location of the major town of each kura using Ramzi (1994 
[1954]) and Tousson (1926). Finally, I assigned each district in 1897 to the nearest 
kura based on the proximity of the capital of each district to the kura’s major town 
according to Google maps. 
                                                          
12https://www.google.com/maps/d/viewer?hl=en&t=h&msa=0&ie=UTF8&om=1&mid=zX_awZ
MfxZcs.kyy5P2mblFhs 
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FIGURE A.1 
Distribution of Poll Tax Payments (Dinar) by Kura 
 
Source: Greek and Arabic papyri poll tax registers and receipts in 641-1100. See section A1.7 for 
details. 
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A2. Robustness Checks and Additional Results 
TABLE A.2  
Measurement Error in Poll Tax Payments in 641-1100 
 
Panel (A): Poll Tax in 641-1100 and Copts’ Population Share in 1848-1868 
Dependent variable = 1 if Coptic Christian 
 Full Sample Excluding Kuras of Ihnas 
and Fayum 
Excluding Kura of 
Qahqawa 
Full Sample Full Sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
=1 if median poll tax high in 
district in 641-1100 
-0.128** 
(0.051) 
-0.096* 
(0.045) 
 
 
 
 
-0.069 
(0.046) 
-0.057 
(0.033) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
=1 if average poll tax high in 
district in 641-1100 
 
 
 
 
-0.070 
(0.058) 
-0.128 
(0.127) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
District's median poll tax in 
641-1100 (dinars) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.315** 
(0.127) 
-0.239* 
(0.110) 
District's average poll tax in 
641-1100 (dinars) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.573*** 
(0.168) 
-2.723** 
(1.131) 
 
 
 
 
Control for urbanization? No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Other controls? No Yes No No No No No Yes No Yes 
Number of districts 11 11 5 5 8 8 11 11 11 11 
Observations 2682 2682 1300 1300 1790 1790 2682 2682 2682 2682 
Adjusted R2 0.021 0.062 0.005 0.005 0.011 0.032 0.045 0.061 0.019 0.062 
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Panel (B): Poll Tax in 641-1100 and the Coptic-Muslim Occupational Differences in 1848-1868 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 =1 if 
White-
Collar1 
=1 if 
White-
Collar2 
=1 if 
White-
Collar3 
=1 if 
Professi-
onal 
=1 if High 
Bureau-
cracy 
=1 if 
Mid 
Bureau-
cracy 
=1 if 
Judiciary, 
Military 
=1 if 
Clergy, 
Rural Elite 
=1 if 
Merchant 
=1 if 
Artisan 
=1 if 
Farmer 
=1 if 
Unskilled 
1. Median Poll Tax High in District in 641-1100 Indicator - No Controls 
=1 if Copt 0.112*** 
(0.018) 
0.050 
(0.030) 
0.040 
(0.025) 
-0.004** 
(0.002) 
-0.002 
(0.001) 
0.118*** 
(0.018) 
-0.037*** 
(0.005) 
-0.025 
(0.026) 
-0.010 
(0.012) 
0.207** 
(0.067) 
-0.110 
(0.079) 
-0.137*** 
(0.033) 
Copt * Median poll tax 
high 
0.124 
(0.086) 
0.167 
(0.122) 
0.200* 
(0.106) 
0.004** 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.001) 
0.118 
(0.086) 
-0.001 
(0.013) 
0.044 
(0.034) 
0.033 
(0.019) 
-0.074 
(0.093) 
-0.237 
(0.131) 
0.111 
(0.074) 
Copt * Controls? No No No No No No No No No No No No 
District of origin FE?  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of districts 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 
Observations 2682 2682 2682 2682 2682 2682 2682 2682 2682 2682 2682 2682 
Adjusted R2 0.070 0.023 0.017 -0.002 0.001 0.095 0.035 0.013 0.008 0.062 0.055 0.035 
2. Median Poll Tax High in District in 641-1100 Indicator - With Controls 
Copt -0.682* 
(0.365) 
-1.257** 
(0.534) 
-0.961* 
(0.467) 
0.006 
(0.011) 
0.003 
(0.014) 
-0.692* 
(0.357) 
-0.041 
(0.057) 
-0.534** 
(0.234) 
0.296** 
(0.128) 
-2.013 
(1.590) 
3.098*** 
(0.936) 
-0.123 
(0.682) 
Copt * Median poll tax 
high 
0.091*** 
(0.023) 
0.100* 
(0.053) 
0.153*** 
(0.037) 
0.005*** 
(0.002) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
0.084*** 
(0.022) 
0.004 
(0.009) 
0.005 
(0.033) 
0.052** 
(0.019) 
-0.088 
(0.233) 
-0.265* 
(0.119) 
0.200** 
(0.088) 
Copt * Controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
District of origin FE?  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of districts 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 
Observations 2682 2682 2682 2682 2682 2682 2682 2682 2682 2682 2682 2682 
Adjusted R2 0.083 0.027 0.019 -0.003 -0.001 0.112 0.034 0.018 0.011 0.085 0.075 0.039 
3. Average Poll Tax High in District in 641-1100 Indicator - Excluding Kuras of Ihnas and Fayum - No Controls 
=1 if Copt 0.087*** 
(0.014) 
0.003 
(0.016) 
0.010 
(0.026) 
-0.005* 
(0.002) 
0.000 
(.) 
0.092*** 
(0.016) 
-0.029*** 
(0.001) 
-0.055** 
(0.015) 
0.007 
(0.010) 
0.151** 
(0.052) 
-0.061 
(0.042) 
-0.100 
(0.051) 
Copt * Average poll tax 
high 
0.004 
(0.019) 
0.094** 
(0.026) 
0.042 
(0.030) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
0.004 
(0.020) 
-0.016* 
(0.006) 
0.106*** 
(0.021) 
-0.052** 
(0.012) 
-0.109 
(0.052) 
0.177** 
(0.055) 
-0.110 
(0.054) 
Copt * Controls? No No No No No No No No No No No No 
District of origin FE?  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of districts 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Observations 1300 1300 1300 1300 1300 1300 1300 1300 1300 1300 1300 1300 
Adjusted R2 0.050 0.016 0.009 -0.001 0.006 0.064 0.007 0.017 0.016 0.033 0.058 0.039 
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4. Median Poll Tax High in District in 641-1100 Indicator - Excluding Kura of Qahqawa- No Controls 
=1 if Copt 0.147*** 
(0.037) 
0.116*** 
(0.025) 
0.082** 
(0.030) 
-0.003*** 
(0.001) 
-0.004 
(0.002) 
0.154*** 
(0.038) 
-0.049*** 
(0.003) 
0.017 
(0.023) 
-0.033*** 
(0.009) 
0.284 
(0.158) 
-0.178 
(0.189) 
-0.189*** 
(0.027) 
Copt * Median poll tax 
high 
0.089 
(0.093) 
0.102 
(0.123) 
0.158 
(0.109) 
0.003*** 
(0.001) 
0.004 
(0.002) 
0.082 
(0.093) 
0.011 
(0.013) 
0.002 
(0.033) 
0.056** 
(0.018) 
-0.151 
(0.171) 
-0.169 
(0.217) 
0.163* 
(0.072) 
Copt * Controls? No No No No No No No No No No No No 
District of origin FE?  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of districts 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 
Observations 1790 1790 1790 1790 1790 1790 1790 1790 1790 1790 1790 1790 
Adjusted R2 0.085 0.031 0.022 -0.003 -0.001 0.121 0.039 0.004 0.010 0.077 0.056 0.042 
5. Average Poll Tax (Dinars) in District in 641-1100 - No Controls 
=1 if Copt -0.177 
(0.156) 
-0.479*** 
(0.135) 
-0.349* 
(0.183) 
-0.015 
(0.011) 
0.011 
(0.007) 
-0.174 
(0.160) 
0.038** 
(0.014) 
-0.340*** 
(0.099) 
0.130* 
(0.065) 
-0.201 
(0.536) 
-0.177 
(0.156) 
-0.479*** 
(0.135) 
Copt * Average poll tax 
(dinars) 
0.249 
(0.141) 
0.452*** 
(0.119) 
0.337* 
(0.157) 
0.009 
(0.008) 
-0.011 
(0.006) 
0.250 
(0.144) 
-0.063*** 
(0.012) 
0.266*** 
(0.083) 
-0.115* 
(0.055) 
0.335 
(0.485) 
0.249 
(0.141) 
0.452*** 
(0.119) 
Copt * Controls? No No No No No No No No No No No No 
District of origin FE?  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of districts 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 
Observations 2682 2682 2682 2682 2682 2682 2682 2682 2682 2682 2682 2682 
Adjusted R2 0.071 0.026 0.016 -0.002 0.001 0.097 0.036 0.018 0.009 0.064 0.071 0.026 
6. Average Poll Tax (Dinars) in District in 641-1100 - With Controls 
=1 if Copt -0.274 
(0.372) 
-1.249** 
(0.544) 
-0.461 
(0.560) 
0.018 
(0.016) 
0.001 
(0.015) 
-0.294 
(0.353) 
-0.105* 
(0.053) 
-0.870*** 
(0.185) 
0.789*** 
(0.030) 
0.151 
(1.325) 
0.338 
(0.525) 
-0.027 
(0.839) 
Copt * Average poll tax 
(dinars) 
1.856** 
(0.599) 
0.612 
(0.801) 
2.515** 
(0.815) 
0.070** 
(0.029) 
0.007 
(0.025) 
1.779** 
(0.580) 
-0.184 
(0.129) 
-1.059*** 
(0.262) 
1.903*** 
(0.035) 
6.495*** 
(1.740) 
-10.494*** 
(0.586) 
1.485 
(1.216) 
Copt * Controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
District of origin FE?  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of districts 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 
Observations 2682 2682 2682 2682 2682 2682 2682 2682 2682 2682 2682 2682 
Adjusted R2 0.082 0.026 0.018 -0.003 -0.001 0.111 0.034 0.018 0.011 0.088 0.077 0.037 
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7. Median Poll Tax (Dinars) in District in 641-1100 - No Controls 
=1 if Copt -0.189 
(0.216) 
-0.307 
(0.316) 
-0.430 
(0.270) 
-0.014*** 
(0.004) 
-0.006 
(0.004) 
-0.168 
(0.217) 
-0.046 
(0.037) 
-0.072 
(0.134) 
-0.123* 
(0.064) 
0.345 
(0.332) 
0.565 
(0.429) 
-0.479** 
(0.201) 
Copt * Median poll tax 
(dinars) 
0.305 
(0.215) 
0.363 
(0.310) 
0.477 
(0.266) 
0.010*** 
(0.003) 
0.005 
(0.003) 
0.290 
(0.215) 
0.009 
(0.036) 
0.050 
(0.115) 
0.114* 
(0.057) 
-0.141 
(0.280) 
-0.681 
(0.377) 
0.345 
(0.191) 
Copt * Controls? No No No No No No No No No No No No 
District of origin FE?  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of districts 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 
Observations 2682 2682 2682 2682 2682 2682 2682 2682 2682 2682 2682 2682 
Adjusted R2 0.070 0.022 0.016 -0.002 0.001 0.095 0.035 0.013 0.008 0.062 0.056 0.035 
8. Median Poll Tax (Dinars) in District in 641-1100 - With Controls 
=1 if Copt -0.937** 
(0.358) 
-1.535** 
(0.528) 
-1.386** 
(0.461) 
-0.008 
(0.011) 
-0.004 
(0.014) 
-0.925** 
(0.350) 
-0.051 
(0.057) 
-0.547** 
(0.240) 
0.149 
(0.130) 
-1.779 
(1.644) 
3.844*** 
(0.978) 
-0.679 
(0.698) 
Copt * Median poll tax 
(dinars) 
0.224*** 
(0.056) 
0.242* 
(0.132) 
0.373*** 
(0.093) 
0.013*** 
(0.004) 
0.006 
(0.004) 
0.206*** 
(0.054) 
0.009 
(0.021) 
0.009 
(0.081) 
0.131** 
(0.044) 
-0.189 
(0.567) 
-0.669** 
(0.282) 
0.485* 
(0.219) 
Copt * Controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
District of origin FE?  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of districts 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 
Observations 2682 2682 2682 2682 2682 2682 2682 2682 2682 2682 2682 2682 
Adjusted R2 0.083 0.027 0.019 -0.003 -0.001 0.112 0.034 0.018 0.011 0.085 0.076 0.038 
 
Source: The 1848-1868 population census samples combined with multiple data sources. See section 4.6.1 in the main text and sections A1.1, A1.4, A1.7, A1.8, A1.9, 
A1.10 in the online appendix for details. Standard errors clustered at the district of origin level are in parentheses. A constant term is included in all regressions of panel 
(A). * p-value < 0.1, ** p-value < 0.05, *** p-value < 0.01. 
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TABLE A.3  
OLS Estimates - Standard Errors Clustered at the Kura Level 
 
Panel (A): Poll Tax, Arab Settlement, and Copts’ Population Share in 1848-1868 
Dependent Variable =1 if Coptic Christian 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
=1 if average poll tax high in 
district in 641-1100 
-0.163** 
(0.031) 
-0.281** 
(0.066) 
-0.551 
(0.249) 
-0.176** 
(0.035) 
-0.617 
(0.448) 
     
=1 if Arab settlement in 
district in 700-969 
     -0.071* 
(0.040) 
-0.074* 
(0.039) 
-0.079** 
(0.034) 
-0.057*** 
(0.020) 
-0.091*** 
(0.026) 
Controls for urbanization and 
religiosity? 
No 
 
Yes Yes No 
 
Yes No 
 
Yes Yes No 
 
Yes 
Other controls? No No Yes No Yes No No Yes No Yes 
Province of origin FE?  No No No Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes 
Number of districts 11 11 11 11 11 76 76 35 76 35 
Observations 2682 2682 2682 2682 2682 16641 16641 6792 16641 6792 
Adjusted R2 0.047 0.058 0.060 0.057 0.075 0.017 0.017 0.020 0.078 0.053 
 
Panel (B): Poll Tax, Arab Settlement, and the Coptic-Muslim Occupational Differences in 1848-1868 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 =1 if 
White-
Collar1 
=1 if 
White-
Collar2 
=1 if 
White-
Collar3 
=1 if 
Professi-
onal 
=1 if High 
Bureau-
cracy 
=1 if 
Mid 
Bureau-
cracy 
=1 if 
Judiciary, 
Military 
=1 if 
Clergy, 
Rural Elite 
=1 if 
Merchant 
=1 if 
Artisan 
=1 if 
Farmer 
=1 if 
Unskilled 
1. Average Poll Tax High in District in 641-1100 Indicator - No Controls 
=1 if Copt 0.087*** 
(0.000) 
0.003*** 
(0.000) 
0.010*** 
(0.000) 
-0.005*** 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.092*** 
(0.000) 
-0.029*** 
(0.000) 
-0.055*** 
(0.000) 
0.007 
(.) 
0.151*** 
(0.000) 
-0.061*** 
(0.000) 
-0.100*** 
(0.000) 
Copt * Poll tax 0.074 
(0.041) 
0.129** 
(0.023) 
0.097* 
(0.036) 
0.003** 
(0.001) 
-0.003 
(0.002) 
0.074 
(0.042) 
-0.018** 
(0.003) 
0.073** 
(0.023) 
-0.032* 
(0.013) 
0.110 
(0.168) 
-0.143 
(0.203) 
-0.063 
(0.034) 
Copt * Controls? No No No No No No No No No No No No 
District of origin FE?  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of kuras 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Observations 2682 2682 2682 2682 2682 2682 2682 2682 2682 2682 2682 2682 
Adjusted R2 0.072 0.026 0.016 -0.002 0.001 0.097 0.036 0.018 0.009 0.065 0.056 0.035 
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 =1 if 
White-
Collar1 
=1 if 
White-
Collar2 
=1 if 
White-
Collar3 
=1 if 
Professi-
onal 
=1 if High 
Bureau-
cracy 
=1 if 
Bureau-
cracy 
=1 if 
Judiciary, 
Military 
=1 if 
Clergy, 
Rural Elite 
=1 if 
Merchant 
=1 if 
Artisan 
=1 if 
Farmer 
=1 if 
Unskilled 
2. Average Poll Tax High in District in 641-1100 Indicator - With Controls 
Copt 0.875** 
(0.238) 
-1.278** 
(0.385) 
0.928 
(0.407) 
0.052 
(0.030) 
-0.007 
(0.012) 
0.830** 
(0.229) 
-0.294* 
(0.115) 
-1.859*** 
(0.145) 
2.206*** 
(0.031) 
6.541** 
(1.501) 
-7.618*** 
(0.063) 
0.150 
(1.162) 
Copt * Poll tax 0.349* 
(0.116) 
0.032 
(0.201) 
0.439 
(0.211) 
0.011 
(0.009) 
-0.001 
(0.006) 
0.339** 
(0.105) 
-0.050 
(0.030) 
-0.267** 
(0.075) 
0.406*** 
(0.011) 
1.701* 
(0.599) 
-2.268*** 
(0.017) 
0.129 
(0.410) 
Copt * Controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
District of origin FE?  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of kuras 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Observations 2682 2682 2682 2682 2682 2682 2682 2682 2682 2682 2682 2682 
Adjusted R2 0.081 0.026 0.018 -0.003 -0.001 0.111 0.034 0.019 0.011 0.089 0.077 0.037 
3. Arab Settlement in District in 700-969 Indicator - No Controls 
=1 if Copt 0.104*** 
(0.017) 
0.038** 
(0.018) 
0.056*** 
(0.019) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.002** 
(0.001) 
0.107*** 
(0.017) 
-0.022*** 
(0.005) 
-0.045*** 
(0.004) 
0.018** 
(0.008) 
0.212*** 
(0.037) 
-0.158*** 
(0.041) 
-0.110*** 
(0.013) 
Copt * Arab settlement 0.153** 
(0.073) 
0.183** 
(0.085) 
0.151* 
(0.086) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
0.157** 
(0.073) 
-0.004 
(0.010) 
0.035** 
(0.014) 
-0.032*** 
(0.010) 
-0.059 
(0.072) 
-0.037 
(0.102) 
-0.055** 
(0.025) 
Copt * Controls? No No No No No No No No No No No No 
District of origin FE?  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of kuras 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 
Observations 16641 16641 16641 16641 16641 16641 16641 16641 16641 16641 16641 16641 
Adjusted R2 0.087 0.035 0.028 0.002 0.004 0.116 0.035 0.011 0.017 0.039 0.105 0.060 
4. Arab Settlement in District in 700-969 Indicator - With Controls 
Copt 0.051 
(0.195) 
-0.166 
(0.261) 
-0.060 
(0.280) 
-0.006 
(0.010) 
0.026 
(0.021) 
0.031 
(0.200) 
-0.092*** 
(0.029) 
-0.125 
(0.091) 
0.106 
(0.077) 
-0.438* 
(0.236) 
0.157 
(0.412) 
0.342*** 
(0.113) 
Copt * Arab settlement 0.098 
(0.070) 
0.082 
(0.088) 
0.080 
(0.089) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.003 
(0.002) 
0.101 
(0.071) 
-0.018*** 
(0.006) 
0.002 
(0.022) 
-0.002 
(0.009) 
-0.122* 
(0.069) 
0.102 
(0.132) 
-0.060* 
(0.033) 
Copt * Controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
District of origin FE?  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of kuras 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 
Observations 6792 6792 6792 6792 6792 6792 6792 6792 6792 6792 6792 6792 
Adjusted R2 0.062 0.024 0.024 0.001 0.006 0.083 0.047 0.015 0.015 0.063 0.109 0.068 
Source: The 1848-1868 population census samples combined with multiple data sources. See section 4.6.1 in the main text and sections A1.1, A1.4, A1.7, A1.8, A1.9, 
A1.10 in the online appendix for details. Standard errors clustered at the kura of origin level are in parentheses. A constant term is included in columns 1-8 of panel (A). * 
p-value < 0.1, ** p-value < 0.05, *** p-value < 0.01. 
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TABLE A.4 
Relevance and Exogeneity of the Distance to Arish 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 =1 if poll 
tax high in 
district in 
641-1100 
=1 if Arab 
settlement in 
district in 
700-969 
Log  
(urban 
population) 
in 300 
=1 if 
district on 
Holy 
Family 
route in 400 
% Villages with 
Coptic 
monasteries in 
1200 
=1 if 
Autopract 
estates in 
district in 
600 
=1 if 
Byzantine 
garrison in 
district in 
600 
District's 
distance to 
Arish (km) 
-0.0049*** 
(0.0011) 
-0.0006* 
(0.0003) 
0.0003 
(0.0005) 
-0.0005 
(0.0003) 
0.0002*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0006 
(0.0005) 
-0.0001 
(0.0003) 
Districts 11 76 76 76 76 35 76 
Adjusted R2 0.656 0.032 -0.009 0.015 0.147 0.003 -0.012 
Source: Multiple data sources. See section 4.6.2 in the main text and sections A1.4, A1.7, A1.8, A1.9, A1.10 for details. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. A constant term is included in all regressions. 
 
TABLE A.5 
Poll Tax, Settlement, and Copts' Population Share in 1848-1868 - IV Estimates 
 
I. Second Stage Regressions - Dependent Variable =1 if Coptic Christian 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
=1 if average poll tax high in 
district in 641-1100 
-0.215*** 
(0.043) 
-0.374** 
(0.147) 
-0.592** 
(0.251) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
=1 if Arab settlement in district in 
700-969 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.234*** 
(0.071) 
-0.243*** 
(0.075) 
-0.013 
(0.117) 
Controls for urbanization and 
religiosity? 
No 
 
Yes Yes No 
 
Yes Yes 
Other controls? No No Yes No No Yes 
II. First Stage Regressions 
 Dependent Variable in (1) - (3) =1 if 
average poll tax high in district in  
Dependent Variable in (4) - (6) =1 if 
Arab settlement in district 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
District's distance to Arish (km) -0.005*** 
(0.001) 
-0.002*** 
(0.001) 
-0.001*** 
(0.000) 
-0.001*** 
(0.000) 
-0.001*** 
(0.000) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
Controls for urbanization and 
religiosity? 
No 
 
Yes Yes No 
 
Yes Yes 
Other controls? No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 2682 2682 2682 16641 16641 6792 
Number of districts 11 11 11 76 76 35 
Kleibergen-Paap LM (P-value) 0.036 0.075 0.162 0.003 0.003 0.096 
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic 30.408 10.230 1264.182 9.972 10.072 1.703 
Anderson-Rubin Wald (P-value) 0.000 0.004 0.047 0.001 0.001 0.921 
Source: The 1848-1868 census samples combined with multiple data sources. See section 4.6.2 in the main text and 
sections A1.1, A1.4, A1.7, A1.8, A1.9, A1.10 for details. Standard errors clustered at the district of origin level are in 
parentheses. A constant term is included in the estimation and is partialled out in both stages. 
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TABLE A.6 
 Poll Tax, Arab Settlement, and the Coptic-Muslim Occupational Differences in 1848-1868 - IV Estimates 
 
Panel (A): Average Poll Tax High in District in 641-1100 Indicator - No Controls 
I. Second Stage Regressions - Dependent Variable Indicated on Top of Each Column 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 =1 if 
White-
Collar1 
=1 if 
White-
Collar2 
=1 if 
White-
Collar3 
=1 if 
Professi-
onal 
=1 if High 
Bureau-
cracy 
=1 if Mid-
Low 
Bureau-
cracy 
=1 if 
Judiciary, 
Military 
=1 if 
Clergy, 
Rural Elite 
=1 if 
Merchant 
=1 if 
Artisan 
=1 if 
Farmer 
=1 if 
Unskilled 
=1 if Copt 0.067** 
(0.029) 
-0.001 
(0.018) 
-0.001 
(0.030) 
-0.005** 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.071** 
(0.031) 
-0.028*** 
(0.002) 
-0.040* 
(0.024) 
0.001 
(0.013) 
0.057 
(0.120) 
0.058 
(0.135) 
-0.114** 
(0.048) 
Copt * Poll 
tax 
0.118*** 
(0.045) 
0.138*** 
(0.045) 
0.121** 
(0.055) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
-0.005*** 
(0.002) 
0.120*** 
(0.046) 
-0.020*** 
(0.004) 
0.040* 
(0.022) 
-0.017 
(0.017) 
0.312* 
(0.162) 
-0.401** 
(0.174) 
-0.032 
(0.063) 
II. First Stage Regressions - Dependent Variable is Copt * Poll Tax 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
=1 if Copt 3.088*** 
(0.335) 
3.088*** 
(0.335) 
3.088*** 
(0.335) 
3.088*** 
(0.335) 
3.088*** 
(0.335) 
3.088*** 
(0.335) 
3.088*** 
(0.335) 
3.088*** 
(0.335) 
3.088*** 
(0.335) 
3.088*** 
(0.335) 
3.088*** 
(0.335) 
3.088*** 
(0.335) 
Copt * Dist. 
to Arish 
-0.006*** 
(0.001) 
-0.006*** 
(0.001) 
-0.006*** 
(0.001) 
-0.006*** 
(0.001) 
-0.006*** 
(0.001) 
-0.006*** 
(0.001) 
-0.006*** 
(0.001) 
-0.006*** 
(0.001) 
-0.006*** 
(0.001) 
-0.006*** 
(0.001) 
-0.006*** 
(0.001) 
-0.006*** 
(0.001) 
Observations 2682 2682 2682 2682 2682 2682 2682 2682 2682 2682 2682 2682 
Districts 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 
Kleibergen-
Paap LM test 
(P-value) 
0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 
Kleibergen-
Paap Wald F 
statistic 
46.740 46.740 46.740 46.740 46.740 46.740 46.740 46.740 46.740 46.740 46.740 46.740 
Anderson-
Rubin Wald 
test (P-value) 
0.033 0.034 0.085 0.274 0.005 0.031 0.001 0.183 0.358 0.047 0.024 0.645 
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Panel (B): Arab Settlement in District in 700-969 Indicator - No Controls 
I. Second Stage Regressions - Dependent Variable Indicated on Top of Each Column 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 =1 if 
White-
Collar1 
=1 if 
White-
Collar2 
=1 if 
White-
Collar3 
=1 if 
Professi-
onal 
=1 if High 
Bureau-
cracy 
=1 if Mid-
Low 
Bureau-
cracy 
=1 if 
Judiciary, 
Military 
=1 if 
Clergy, 
Rural Elite 
=1 if 
Merchant 
=1 if 
Artisan 
=1 if 
Farmer 
=1 if 
Unskilled 
=1 if Copt -0.044 
(0.082) 
-0.134 
(0.095) 
-0.104 
(0.093) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
-0.003 
(0.002) 
-0.039 
(0.082) 
-0.032*** 
(0.008) 
-0.058*** 
(0.016) 
0.030* 
(0.018) 
0.137** 
(0.061) 
0.036 
(0.119) 
-0.070 
(0.051) 
Copt * Arab 
settlement 
0.452*** 
(0.117) 
0.529*** 
(0.135) 
0.473*** 
(0.134) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
0.001 
(0.003) 
0.453*** 
(0.117) 
0.015 
(0.012) 
0.061*** 
(0.021) 
-0.056** 
(0.025) 
0.091 
(0.132) 
-0.429*** 
(0.160) 
-0.135 
(0.087) 
II. First Stage Regressions - Dependent Variable is Copt * Arab settlement 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
=1 if Copt 1.554*** 
(0.207) 
1.554*** 
(0.207) 
1.554*** 
(0.207) 
1.554*** 
(0.207) 
1.554*** 
(0.207) 
1.554*** 
(0.207) 
1.554*** 
(0.207) 
1.554*** 
(0.207) 
1.554*** 
(0.207) 
1.554*** 
(0.207) 
1.554*** 
(0.207) 
1.554*** 
(0.207) 
Copt * Dist. 
to Arish 
-0.002*** 
(0.001) 
-0.002*** 
(0.001) 
-0.002*** 
(0.001) 
-0.002*** 
(0.001) 
-0.002*** 
(0.001) 
-0.002*** 
(0.001) 
-0.002*** 
(0.001) 
-0.002*** 
(0.001) 
-0.002*** 
(0.001) 
-0.002*** 
(0.001) 
-0.002*** 
(0.001) 
-0.002*** 
(0.001) 
Observations 16641 16641 16641 16641 16641 16641 16641 16641 16641 16641 16641 16641 
Districts 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 76 
Kleibergen-
Paap LM test 
(P-value) 
0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
Kleibergen-
Paap Wald F 
statistic 
19.707 19.707 19.707 19.707 19.707 19.707 19.707 19.707 19.707 19.707 19.707 19.707 
Anderson-
Rubin Wald 
test (P-value) 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.628 0.782 0.000 0.193 0.003 0.014 0.465 0.000 0.090 
Source: The 1848-1868 census samples combined with multiple data sources. See section 4.6.2 in the main text and sections A1.1, A1.4, A1.7, A1.8, A1.9, A1.10 for details. 
Standard errors clustered at the district of origin level are in parentheses. District of origin fixed effects are included in the estimation and are partialled out in both stages. 
* p-value < 0.1, ** p-value < 0.05, *** p-value < 0.01. 
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TABLE A.7 
Poll Tax, Arab Settlement, and Copts’ Population Share in 1200 and 1500 
Dependent Variable is the Share of Villages with at Least One Coptic Church or Monastery in Each District 
 1200: Columns (1) - (4) 1500: Columns (5) - (8) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
=1 if average poll tax high in 
district in 641-1100 
-0.011 
(0.056) 
-0.049 
(0.159) 
 
 
 
 
-0.164** 
(0.058) 
0.060 
(0.182) 
 
 
 
 
=1 if Arab settlement in 
district in 700-969 
 
 
 
 
-0.047 
(0.045) 
-0.043 
(0.051) 
 
 
 
 
-0.077*** 
(0.027) 
-0.072*** 
(0.024) 
Controls for urbanization and 
religiosity? 
No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations (Districts) 11 11 76 76 11 11 76 76 
Adjusted R2 -0.105 -0.410 0.001 -0.025 0.584 0.600 0.147 0.146 
Source: Data on medieval churches and monasteries combined with other data sources. See section 4.6.3 in the main text and sections A1.4, A1.7, A1.8, A1.9, and A1.10 in 
the online appendix for details. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * p-value < 0.1, ** p-value < 0.05, *** p-value < 0.01. A constant is included in all regressions. 
 
TABLE A.8 
Intergenerational Occupational Mobility and Religious Group Effects in 1848-1868 
Dependent variable is son’s occupational outcome 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 =1 if 
White-
Collar1 
=1 if 
White-
Collar2 
=1 if 
White-
Collar3 
=1 if 
Professi-
onal 
=1 if 
High 
Bureau-
cracy 
=1 if 
Mid-
Low 
Bureau-
cracy 
=1 if 
Judiciary, 
Military 
=1 if 
Clergy, 
Rural 
Elite 
=1 if 
Merchant 
=1 if 
Artisan 
=1 if 
Farmer 
=1 if 
Unskilled 
=1 if father of same 
occupation 
0.340*** 
(0.101) 
0.265*** 
(0.056) 
0.321*** 
(0.049) 
0.333 
(0.315) 
0.199 
(0.175) 
0.477*** 
(0.120) 
0.136** 
(0.069) 
0.380*** 
(0.137) 
0.444*** 
(0.103) 
0.577*** 
(0.040) 
0.602*** 
(0.022) 
0.626*** 
(0.027) 
Share of occupation in 
religious group 
1.461*** 
(0.417) 
1.647** 
(0.690) 
1.563** 
(0.685) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.134 
(0.095) 
1.120*** 
(0.350) 
1.362*** 
(0.195) 
2.109 
(2.981) 
0.398 
(6.364) 
0.653*** 
(0.178) 
1.011*** 
(0.242) 
0.195 
(0.304) 
N 2168 2168 2168 2168 2168 2168 2168 2168 2168 2168 2168 2168 
Source: The 1848-1868 census samples. Sample is restricted to Egyptian free local Coptic and Muslim adult sons for whom I observe father’s occupation, with non-
missing religion, age, nationality, ethnicity, occupation, and district of origin. See section 5.1 in the main text and section A1.1 in the online appendix for details. A constant 
is included in all regressions. Standard errors clustered at the household level are in parentheses.  
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TABLE A.9 
Copts’ Tax Revolts in 726-768 
 
Year Region Reasons Cited Parties Revolting 
726 Nile Delta Tightening state control over the tax system Copts 
740 Nile Valley Higher tax enforcement, collecting poll tax from 
fugitives, higher tax rate, uniform tax regardless 
of income 
Copts 
750 Nile Delta Heavy taxation and general suffering Copts; Arabs also revolted to 
overthrow the Umayyads 
753 Nile Delta Reorganizing the tax system under the Abbasids 
and heavy taxation 
Copts 
768 Nile Delta Abbasids' fiscal reforms Copts 
 
Sources: Morimoto (1981, pp. 145-72) and Mikhail (2004, pp. 195-211). See section 4.4 in the main text. I 
excluded ten tax revolts that erupted in 783-866 (nine of which were in the Nile Delta) because both Arabs 
and Copts participated in those revolts and, thus, they may have been motivated by other reasons. 
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TABLE A.10  
 Copts' Population Share and the Coptic-Muslim Occupational Differences in 1848-1868 
 
Dependent Variable Indicated on Top of Each Column 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 =1 if 
White-
Collar1 
=1 if 
White-
Collar2 
=1 if 
White-
Collar3 
=1 if 
Professi-
onal 
=1 if 
High 
Bureau-
cracy 
=1 if 
Mid-
Low 
Bureau-
cracy 
=1 if 
Judiciary, 
Military 
=1 if 
Clergy, 
Rural 
Elite 
=1 if 
Merchant 
=1 if 
Artisan 
=1 if 
Farmer 
=1 if 
Unskilled 
Copt 0.367*** 
(0.053) 
0.346*** 
(0.060) 
0.337*** 
(0.062) 
-0.004** 
(0.002) 
-0.004*** 
(0.001) 
0.375*** 
(0.053) 
-0.020*** 
(0.007) 
-0.001 
(0.009) 
-0.008 
(0.011) 
0.261*** 
(0.069) 
-0.401*** 
(0.063) 
-0.198*** 
(0.039) 
Copt * Percent Copts 
in district 
-1.199*** 
(0.256) 
-1.391*** 
(0.279) 
-1.326*** 
(0.291) 
0.009 
(0.017) 
0.009 
(0.006) 
-1.216*** 
(0.260) 
-0.024 
(0.037) 
-0.168** 
(0.079) 
0.065 
(0.057) 
-0.506 
(0.327) 
1.440*** 
(0.467) 
0.393 
(0.258) 
District of origin FE?  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 16641 16641 16641 16641 16641 16641 16641 16641 16641 16641 16641 16641 
Adjusted R2 0.102 0.042 0.034 0.002 0.004 0.136 0.035 0.011 0.017 0.040 0.109 0.061 
 
Source: The 1848-1868 census samples. See footnote 10 in the paper and section A1.1 in the online appendix for details. Standard errors clustered at the district of origin 
level are in parentheses. * p-value < 0.1, ** p-value < 0.05, *** p-value < 0.01. 
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A3. Proofs of the Conceptual Framework 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION (1): Let 𝑦∗ denote the threshold level of income at which 
a Copt is indifferent about conversion to Islam at a given level of religiosity. Copts’ 
population share is given by 𝑀𝑐 = ∫ 𝑓(𝑦)𝑑𝑦∞𝑦∗ = 1 − 𝐹(𝑦∗). It directly follows that: 
𝜕𝑀𝑐
𝜕𝜏
= −𝑓(𝑦∗) × 𝜕𝑦∗
𝜕𝜏
= −𝑓(𝑦∗) × −𝑢′(𝑦∗ − 𝜏)
𝑢′(𝑦∗) − 𝑢′(𝑦∗ − 𝜏) < 0 
 Because 𝑢′(. ) > 0 and  𝑢′′(. ) < 0∎  
PROOF OF PROPOSITION (2): 
𝜕
𝜕𝜏
𝐸(𝑦|𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶) = 𝜕
𝜕𝜏
𝐸(𝑦|𝑦 > 𝑦∗) = 𝜕
𝜕𝜏
�
∫ 𝑦𝑓(𝑦)𝑑𝑦∞𝑦∗1 − 𝐹(𝑦∗) �
= 1
�1 − 𝐹(𝑦∗)�2 �−𝑦∗𝑓(𝑦∗)𝜕𝑦∗𝜕𝜏 �1 − 𝐹(𝑦∗)�
+ 𝑓(𝑦∗)𝜕𝑦∗
𝜕𝜏
� 𝑦𝑓(𝑦)𝑑𝑦∞
𝑦∗
� = 𝑓(𝑦∗)𝜕𝑦∗𝜕𝜏1 − 𝐹(𝑦∗) �−𝑤∗ + ∫ 𝑦𝑓(𝑦)𝑑𝑦∞𝑦∗1 − 𝐹(𝑦∗) �
= 𝑓(𝑦∗)𝜕𝑦∗𝜕𝜏1 − 𝐹(𝑦∗) [𝐸(𝑦|𝑦 > 𝑦∗) − 𝑦∗] > 0 
𝜕
𝜕𝜏
𝐸(𝑦|𝑀𝑢𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀) = 𝜕
𝜕𝜏
𝐸(𝑦|𝑦 ≤ 𝑦∗) = 𝜕
𝜕𝜏
�
∫ 𝑦𝑓(𝑦)𝑑𝑦𝑦∗0
𝐹(𝑦∗) �
= 1
�𝐹(𝑦∗)�2 �𝑦∗𝑓(𝑦∗)𝜕𝑦∗𝜕𝜏 �𝐹(𝑦∗)� − 𝑓(𝑦∗)𝜕𝑦∗𝜕𝜏 � 𝑦𝑓(𝑦)𝑑𝑦𝑦∗0 �
= 𝑓(𝑦∗)𝜕𝑦∗𝜕𝜏
𝐹(𝑦∗) �𝑦∗ − ∫ 𝑦𝑓(𝑦)𝑑𝑦𝑦∗0 𝐹(𝑦∗) � = 𝑓(𝑦∗)𝜕𝑦∗𝜕𝜏𝐹(𝑦∗) [𝑦∗ − 𝐸(𝑦|𝑦 ≤ 𝑦∗)]> 0 
Define the Coptic-Muslim income gap as 𝛥 ≡ 𝐸(𝑦|𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶) − 𝐸(𝑦|𝑀𝑢𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀) =
𝐸(𝑦|𝑦 > 𝑦∗) − 𝐸(𝑦|𝑦 ≤ 𝑦∗). It follows that the derivative of 𝛥 with respect to the poll 
tax is: 
𝜕𝛥
𝜕𝜏
= 𝑓(𝑦∗)𝜕𝑦∗
𝜕𝜏
�
11 − 𝐹(𝑦∗) (𝐸(𝑦|𝑦 > 𝑦∗) − 𝑦∗) − 1𝐹(𝑦∗) �𝑦∗ − 𝐸(𝑦|𝑦 ≤ 𝑦∗)�� 
This could be either positive or negative depending on the income distribution ∎ 
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PROOF OF PROPOSITION (3): It follows from Jewitt (2004) and 𝜕𝑦
∗
𝜕𝜏
> 0. 
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